AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
IDENTIFICATION
NO.

704 05 101

RECORDS CODE SHEET
SND 4535 (Rev. 1-65)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)	Code	Col.	SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)	Code	Col.
Bureau Number	138917	16-21	Weather		16-21
Reporting Custodian	298	22-24	Kind of Flight	1A1	22-24
Type Duty	J	25	Relative Wind - Direction		25
Major Command	1	26	Relative Wind - Velocity		26
Aircraft Damage	A	27	Special Attention	—	27
Aircraft Injury	A	28	Clearance	1	28
Time of Day	2	29	Maneuver prior to Occurrence		29
Carrier Hull Number	—	30	Number of other Aircraft		30
First Accident type	36	31-32	Primary Causal Factor		31-32
First Accident phase	48	33-35	Altitude of Occurrence or Emergency	18Ø	33-35
Second Accident type		36-37			
Second Accident phase		38-40	Environmental Factors	9AF	38-40
Type of Operation	3	41-42			
Contributing Cause Factors	~~Z~~	43-47	Non-Navy Injury ("R")		42
Pilot Factor, First		48-49	Number of "A" or "U" Injury	Ø4	43-44
Pilot Factor, Second		50-51	Number of "B" Injury		46-47
Pilot Factor, Third		52-53	Number of "C" Injury		48-49
First other Personnel Factor		54-55	Number of "D" Injury		50-51
Second other Personnel Factor		56-57	Number of "E" Injury		52-53
Primary Major Material Factor		58	Number of "F" Injury		54-55
Secondary Major Material Factor		59	Number of "G" Injury		56-57
Design		60	Location	AT CALIF	62-68
Facilities	D	61			
Special Data & Cond.	GJ ~~A~~	62-65			
Special Data & Cond./~~Type of Incident~~	~~A~~	66			
Primary Cause	~~Z~~	67			
1st Posit. of Pri. Causal Factor		68			
1st Possible Cause & Causal Factor	3T	69-71			
2nd Possible Cause & Causal Factor	185	72-74			
No Personnel Card ("R")	Q	80			

ACCIDENT DAMAGE A (9)
ACCIDENT INJURY A (10)
FISCAL YEAR 7 (75)

I. D. NO.	Don't Count			Enemy Action		Other Aircraft		
	7	Ø	4	Ø	5	1	Ø	1
	1 YR	2 MO	3	4 DAY	5	6 TYP	7 SEQ	8
Model	—	A	3	B				
	11	12	13	14	15			

Model Code Ø1 (76-77)

PERSONNEL STATISTICS
(Card No. 3)

File Number (b) (6) [redacted]

	Name (16-31)	Rank/Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Inj to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CV Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Total Time Jet or Helo
03	PARKS R E	3	1	G	A	A	1	A	1	2	Ø9	3	28	Ø2	Ø2	Ø2	3	Ø6	Ø4	Ø7
		32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49	51	52-53	55	56-57	58-59	62-63	65-66	68	69-70	71-72	73-74
04	KING D E	3	1	H	A	Y	2	A	1	H	—	3	42	Ø9	83	Ø4	A	18	Ø5	99

Name
File Number (b) (6) [redacted]

IBM PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE

CLOSED

03 JUL 1967

25 MAR 1968

CODED ___ REVIEWED ___ LOGGED BB PUNCHED ___ VERIFIED ___

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST ______ (Initials) ______ (Date)

7-14-67

Parks Dr 396

I.D. Number	GCI	Model	FY	Model Code
7Φ4Φ51Φ1	ΦΦ	-A3B	7	Φ1

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	H6	J1	A1	EC	S7	S1	S2	S3	A	12		Φ1

CARD 65

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	P5	Q5	DC	E2	N2	L7	O1	A6	A	22		Φ1

CARD 65A

TA	TM									INJ	No. of Cds	CZ	Seq of Ind

CARD 65B

Type Aircraft	Type Mishap	Top at Scene	Egress	Ejt. Info	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	Type Seat	Firing Method	Seat Pos.	A/C Attit.	Ejt. Alt.	Air-speed	Weight	Chute Op. Alt.	In Crash Area	Time in Water	Time in Raft	25 SEP 1967	Vertebral Fractures	Ejt. Fat. Cause	Injury	Combat Zone	Seq of ID
A	F	D	Z																			A		Φ1

CARD 66

SND 45-[illegible] (Rev. 1/65) (Back)

OTHER INJURED PERSONNEL

(Modified Card No. 1)

C.C. 79-80	FILE NUMBER	NAME	Rank or Rate	EB Service	Age	Yrs. Exper.	Status	Position	Ins. to Ind.	Abandon A/C
	16 17 18 19 20 21	22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49
05	(b) (6)	MILLER C	VE	I	–	–	X	3	A	I
06		READER J	M3	I	D	–	Q	4	A	I
07										
08										
09										
10										
11										
12										
13										
14										
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										
19										
19										
19										
19										

IBM: Place an "X" overpunch in CC80 if these cards are coded.

Parker Line 346

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
70405101	00	-A3B	7	01

TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL	WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VISIBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP		ALERT FACTOR	LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.	SURV. FAC.	FATALS (NO RESCUE)		TRG. DATE	TRG. DATE	TRG. FACTOR		NO EXP	INJURY	CLOSE ZONE	SEQ OF IND.
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
A	F	1	4			4	2	2						N	O	F	H		E					A	H	A						E	E	E	P																	2	A			0	1

CARD 67

TIME OF DAY MISHAP	TIME OF DAY DEPART	TIME OF DAY LOCATE	TIME OF DAY ACC/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.		RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE		NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.	WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND	WEATHER	WIND VEL	RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED		TRG OF RES. TEAMS	COM. TECH AND EQUIP	RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	RES TEAM WORK	TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT	ALERT PROB.	METHOD OF ALERT		TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY	INJURY	CLOSE ZONE	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74

CARD 68



TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	LOC TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC TO RCH.	LOCATOR MEANS	LOC PROB	SURV. SIG. PROB.	TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	RESCUE PROBLEMS		RESCUE PROBLEMS		RESCUE PROBLEMS		RESCUE PROBLEMS		SURVIVOR PROBLEMS		SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.		TOT. TIME	RES REQ.	SEQ OF IND
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74

CARD 69

King Ltr 3961

I.D. Number	GCI	Model	FY	Model Code
7Φ4Φ51Φ1	ΦΦ	-A3B	7	Φ1

CARD 65

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	H6	J1	A1	S7	S1	S2	S3	P5	A	12		Φ2

CARD 65A

TA	TM	INJ	No. of Cds	CZ	Seq of Ind.
	Q5 DC E2 N2 L7 O1 A6	A	22		Φ2

CARD 65B

TA	TM	Type Aircraft	Type Mishap	Top at Scene	Egress	Est. Info	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	Type Seat	Firing Method	Seat Pos.	A/C Attit.	Est. Alt.	Air-speed	Weight	Chute Op. Alt.	In Crash Area	Time in Water	Time in Raft	Vertebral Fractures	Est. Fat. Cause	Injury	Combat Zone	Seq of Ind
A	F		D	Z																		A		Φ2

CARD 66

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
7Ø4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	WIND VEL	WAVE HEIGHT	WAVE INTERVAL	VIS-IBILITY	AIR TEMP	WATER TEMP							ALERT FACTOR	LOC. SITE	SURV. LEFT	LOC. SURV.		SURV. FAC.					FATALS (NO RESCUE)								TRG. DATE		TRG. DATE		TRG. FACTOR																		NO E/R	INJURY	ZONE		SEQ OF IND
A	F	1	4			1	2	2						N	O	F	H		E					A	H	A					I	B	B	R																		2	A			Ø	2

CARD 67

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TIME OF DAY MISHAP	TIME OF DAY DEPART	TIME OF DAY LOCATE	TIME OF DAY A/C/ABAN.	LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.		RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE								NO TO BE RESCUED	NO RESCUED	BACK UP RES. VEH.	WATER TEMP	AIR TEMP	SEA COND	WEATHER	WIND VEL		RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED								TRG. OF RES. TEAMS		COM. TECH AND EQUIP	RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	RES TEAM WORK	TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOPOGRAPHY	DISTANCE	TIME MIS. TO ALERT	ALERT PROB.	METHOD OF ALERT	TIME DEPART	DEP DELAY	INJURY	ZONE	SEQ OF IND

CARD 68

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74
TIME ALERT TO LOC.	PROB IN RTE.	FAIL TO REACH	REASON	TIME LOC. TO RCH.		LOCATOR MEANS		LOC. PROB		SURV. SIG. PROB.		TYPE A/C	TYPE MIS	RESCUE PROBLEMS								RESCUE PROBLEMS								RESCUE PROBLEMS								RESCUE PROBLEMS								SURVIVOR PROBLEMS								SURV. COND	SURV. COND	TIME RCH. TO ACC.				TOT. TIME		RES REQ.	SEQ OF IND

CARD 69

Miller ... 346

I.D. Number	GCI	Model	FY	Model Code
7Ø4Ø61Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

Card	TA (16)	TM (17)	Equipment (18–23)	Equipment (24–29)	Equipment (30–35)	Equipment (36–41)	Equipment (42–47)	Equipment (48–53)	Equipment (54–59)	Equipment (60–67)	INJ (68)	No. of Cds. (69–70)	(71)	CZ (72)	Seq of Ind. (73–74)
CARD 65	A	F	H6	J1	A1	EC	S7	S1	S2	S3	A	13			Ø3
CARD 65A	A	F	P5	Q5	DC	E2	N2	L7	O1	A6	A	23			Ø3
CARD 65B	A	F	A5	R5							A	33			Ø3

CARD 66

Type Aircraft (16)	Type Mishap (17)	(18)	Top. at Scene (19)	Egress (20)	Ejt. Info (21)	Egress Prob. Prior	Egress Prob. During	Egress Prob. After	Type Seat	Firing Method	Seat Pos.	A/C Attit.	Ejt. Alt.	Air-Speed	Weight	Chute Op. Alt.	In Crash Area	Time in Water	Time in Raft	Vertebral Fractures	Ejt. Fat. Cause	Injury	Combat Zone	Seq of Ind.
A	F		D	Z																		A		Ø3

Thiller Ser 396

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
7Ø4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

CARD 67

Type A/C	Type Mis	Wind Vel	Wave Height	Wave Interval	Visibility	Air Temp	Water Temp			Alert Factor	Loc. Site	Surv. Left	Loc. Surv.	Surv. Fac.	Fatals (No Rescue)			Trg. Date	Trg. Date	Trg. Factor						No E/R	Injury		Zone	Seq of Ind
16	17	18 19	20	21	22	23 24	25 26	27 28	29	30 31 32	33	34	35 36	37 38 39	40 41 42	43 44 45	46 47	48 49	50 51	52 53 54	55 56 57	58 59 60	61 62 63	64 65 66	67 68	69	70	71	72	73 74
A	F	1 4			1	2 2				N O F	H		E		A H A			E P	P P							2	A			Ø 3

CARD 68

Time of Day: Mishap	Time of Day: Depart	Time of Day: Locate	Time of Day: Acc/Aban.	Loc. Duty Res. Veh.		Rescue Vehicle Model and Type		No To Be Rescued	No Rescued	Back Up Res. Veh.	Water Temp	Air Temp	Sea Cond	Weather	Wind Vel	Rescue Equipment Used		Trg of Res. Teams	Com. Tech and Equip	Retrv Tech and Equip	Res Team Work	Type Aircraft	Type Mishap	Topography	Distance	Time Mis. to Alert	Alert Prob.	Method of Alert	Time Depart	Dep Delay	Injury		Zone	Seq of Ind
16	17	18	19	20 21	22 23 24	25 26 27 28	29	30	31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39	40	41 42	43 44 45 46	47	48 49	50 51	52 53	54 55	56	57	58	59	60 61	62 63	64 65 66	67	68	69 70	71	72	73 74

CARD 69

Time Alert To Loc.	Prob In Rte.	Fail To Reach	Reason	Time Loc. To Rch.	Locator Means	Loc Prob		Surv. Sig. Prob.	Type A/C	Type Mis	Rescue Problems	Rescue Problems	Rescue Problems	Rescue Problems	Survivor Problems	Surv. Cond	Surv. Cond	Time Rch. To Acc.		Tot. Time	Res Req	Seq of Ind
16 17	18 19	20	21	22 23	24 25 26 27	28 29	30	31 32 33	34	35	36 37 38 39 40 41	42 43 44 45 46 47	48 49 50 51 52 53	54 55 56 57 58 59	60 61 62 63	64	65	66 67	68	69 70	71 72	73 74

Reader Rev. 296

I.D. Number	GCI	Model	FY	Model Code
70405101	00	-A3B	7	01

TA	TM	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	H6	J1	A1	E C	S7	S1	S2	S3	A	12		0104

CARD 65

TA	TM	INJ	No. of Cds.	CZ	Seq of Ind.
A	F	A	22		0104

CARD 65A

TA	TM	INJ	No. of Cds	CZ	Seq of Ind.

CARD 65B

TYPE AIRCRAFT	TYPE MISHAP	TOP AT SCENE	EGRESS	EJT. INFO	Egress Prob. PRIOR	Egress Prob. DURING	Egress Prob. AFTER	TYPE SEAT	FIRING METHOD	SEAT POS	A/C ATTIT.	EJT. ALT.	AIR-SPEED	WEIGHT	CHUTE OP. ALT.	IN CRASH AREA	Time in WATER	Time in RAFT	VERTEBRAL FRACTURES	EJT. FAT. CAUSE	INJURY	COMBAT NONE	Seq of IND
A	F		D	Z																	A		04

CARD 66

Rescue Ser 396

I. D. Number	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
TØ4Ø51Ø1	ØØ	-A3B	7	Ø1

CARD 67

Field	Card columns	Entry
TYPE A/C	16	A
TYPE MIS	17	F
WIND VEL	18–19	IH
WAVE HEIGHT	20	
WAVE INTERVAL	21	
VISIBILITY	22	1
AIR TEMP	23–24	22
WATER TEMP	25–26	
	27–29	
ALERT FACTOR	30–32	NOF
LOC. SITE	33	H
SURV. LEFT	34	
LOC. SURV.	35–37	E
SURV. FAC.	38–39	
FATALS (NO RESCUE)	40–42	AHA
	43–47	
TRG. DATE	48–49	AI
TRG. DATE	50–51	AP
TRG. FACTOR	52–54	
	55–68	
NO E/R	69	2
INJURY	70	A
	71	
ZONE	72	
SEQ OF IND.	73–74	Ø4

CARD 68

Field	Card columns	Entry
TIME OF DAY: MISHAP	16	
TIME OF DAY: DEPART	17	
TIME OF DAY: LOCATE	18	
TIME OF DAY: ACC/ABAN.	19	
LOC. DUTY RES. VEH.	20–21	
	22–24	
RESCUE VEHICLE MODEL AND TYPE	25–29	
NO TO BE RESCUED	30	
NO RESCUED	31	
BACK UP RES. VEH.	32–33	
WATER TEMP	34–35	
AIR TEMP	36–37	
SEA COND	38–39	
WEATHER	40	
WIND VEL	41–42	
	43	
RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED	44–47	
TRG OF RES. TEAMS	48–49	
COM. TECH AND EQUIP	50–51	
RETRV. TECH AND EQUIP	52–53	
RES TEAM WORK	54–55	
TYPE AIRCRAFT	56	
TYPE MISHAP	57	
TOPOGRAPHY	58	
DISTANCE	59	
TIME MIS. TO ALERT	60–61	
ALERT PROB.	62–63	
METHOD OF ALERT	64–66	
TIME DEPART	67	
DEP DELAY	68–69	
INJURY	70	
	71	
ZONE	72	
SEQ OF IND	73–74	

CARD 69

Field	Card columns	Entry
TIME ALERT TO LOC.	16–17	
PROB IN RTE.	18–19	
FAIL TO REACH	20	
REASON	21	
TIME LOC TO RCH.	22–23	
LOCATOR MEANS	24–27	
LOC PROB	28–29	
	30	
SURV. SIG. PROB.	31–33	
TYPE A/C	34	
TYPE MIS	35	
RESCUE PROBLEMS	36–41	
RESCUE PROBLEMS	42–47	
RESCUE PROBLEMS	48–53	
RESCUE PROBLEMS	54–59	
SURVIVOR PROBLEMS	60–63	
SURV. COND	64	
SURV. COND	65	
TIME RCH. TO ACC.	66–67	
	68	
TOT. TIME	69–70	
RES REC.	71–72	
SEQ OF IND.	73–74	

REQUEST FOR CODE SHEET CHANGES

8.24.67
(Date)

From: M&M Dept.
To: (1) Coder
(2) M&M 8-24-67
(3) Log Clerk 8/24
(4) IBM
(5) File Clerk 30 AUG 67

Return to: Open File
Closed File
Master Coder
Other

Ident. No. 70405101 Model A3B BUNO 155917 Model Code 61

Card #1 - Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to

Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to

Card #2 - Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to

Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to

Card # Name Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to

Card # Name Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to

USE THIS SECTION FOR CHANGES TO CARDS 31 THROUGH 59 AND CARDS 20 THROUGH 29.

Card # Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to
" " to
" " to

Card # Chg. col. to
" " to
" " to
" " to
" " to
" " to

☒ Card #(s) 45 IBM, SEE CHANGES TO NARRATIVE BRIEF.
ORIGINATOR, USE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHANGES TO BRIEF.

NOTE: (1) A separate change sheet will be used for each A/C involved.
(2) Change sheet will be stapled to code sheet.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Originator's Signature

☐ Change to 5 x 8 card required.

NOTE TO ORIGINATOR OF CHANGE: If change to narrative brief is required, use the below provided space to reflect the change. Give the whole card text which represents the line of print out containing the area of change. The coders will make the final change to the master code sheet.

Card No.	Narrative
45	Correct spelling of 'VALUE'
	(See code sheet change of 3-17-67)

REQUEST FOR CODE SHEET CHANGES

From: N-M Dept. 7-17-67 (Date)

To: (1) Coder [illegible handwriting] 7/21
(2) M&M [illegible]-1967
(3) Log Clerk [illegible] 30 JUL 1967
(4) IBM
(5) File Clerk

Return to: Open File ______
Closed File ______
Master Coder ______
Other ______

Ident. No. 70405191 Model A3B BUNO 138917 Model Code 01

Card #1 - Chg. col. ______ to ______ Chg. col. ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______ " " ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______ " " ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______ " " ______ to ______

Card #2 - Chg. col. ______ to ______ Chg. col. ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______ " " ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______ " " ______ to ______

Card # ______ Name ______ Chg. col. ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______
______ to ______
______ to ______

Card # ______ Name ______ Chg. col. ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______
" " ______ to ______

USE THIS SECTION FOR CHANGES TO CARDS 31 THROUGH 59 AND CARDS 20 THROUGH 29.

Card #	Chg. col.	to	Card #	Chg. col.	to
33	32-37	9999			
33	17-21	U 9999			

☑ Card #(s) 44 — IBM, SEE CHANGES TO NARRATIVE BRIEF.
ORIGINATOR, USE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHANGES TO BRIEF.

NOTE: (1) A separate change sheet will be used for each A/C involved.
(2) Change sheet will be stapled to code sheet.

______
Originator's Signature

☐ Change to 5 x 8 card required.

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD
OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: RECORDS DEPT. Chg made 3/19/68 DATE 19 MARCH 1968

TO: (1) CODING SECT
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH
(3) ADPE DIV 19 MAR 1968
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH

TRANSACTION CODES

D-Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1-11 and code D in cc 77).

M-Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "00" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.										
YEAR		MONTH		DAY		TYPE REPT	LOG NUMBER		AIRCRAFT NUMBER	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	7	0	4	0	5	1	0	1	0	1

PARKS A 30 138917

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)	TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
1	SPEC DATA & CONDIT	06	67	0322	00	03	D		
2	2ND POSS CAUSAL	06	43	0298	00	01	1		
3	"	06	48	0303	00	02	05		

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6) [redacted]

ORIGINATORS SIGNATURE

3-18-68

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CODE SHEET (Narrative brief on reverse)

SND 4621 (Rev. 11/65)

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 33		CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT		16-21
SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT	9 9 9 9	24-29
POSSIBLE INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT	T Ø 1 Ø 3	32-37
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		40-42
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		44-46
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		48-50
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		52-54
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		56-58
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS		61-63
FIRST MAINT FLT SPEC COMPONENT		65-68
CARD NUMBER	3 3	79-80

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 34		CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:		
MFG P/N		16-31
TOTAL HOURS		34-37
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY		39
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS		41
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL		43-46
AIRCRAFT TOUR		48
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	W	50
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST INSPECTION	2 4 6	53-55
DAYS SINCE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION	7 9	57-58
TYPE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION	C	61
MONTHS SINCE PAR/OVERHAUL	6	67-68
CARD NUMBER	3 4	79-80

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 35		CARD COL.
POSSIBLE OR SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:		
MFG P/N		16-31
TOTAL HOURS		34-37
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY		39
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS		41
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL		43-46
POWER PLANT MODEL NUMBER	J 5 7 P 1 Ø	49-56
POWER PLANT SERIAL NUMBER	P 6 Ø 7 6 2 5	58-64
DIR	2	68
CARD NUMBER	3 5	79-80

CAUSE FACTORS: Z

COMPONENT NO. 1

COMPONENT NO. 2

DESIGN

POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTORS: 3

COMPONENT: T

DESIGN

ACCIDENT DAMAGE: A (9)

ACCIDENT INJURY: A (10)

	Don't Count		Enemy Action			Other Aircraft		
I.D. NO.	7	Ø	4	Ø	5	1	Ø	1
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	YR	MO		DAY		TYP	SEQ	

Model (11-15): – A 3 B

SPECIAL ATTN ("X")

Model Code (76-77): Ø 1

FOR IBM

03 JUL 1967

A COORDINATOR	M&M CODING RECORD			PUNCHED	VERIFIED
DIVISION OFFICER	DATE CODED	CODED BY	LOGGED	PUNCHED	VERIFIED

FOR M&M FILING ONLY

MODEL	BUNO	DATE	IDENT. NUMBER

REPORT NUMBER

CUSTODIAN

7-14-67

ACFT ON AUTHORIZED
CROSS COUNTRY IVST & CHECK FLT. RADAR CONTACT LOST,
RADIO CONTACT LOST, WITH ACFT OVER MOUNTAINOUS TER-
RAIN. WITNESS SAW & HEARD ACFT CRASH IN DEEP SNOW &
HEAVY DRIFTS. FLT PATH OF ACFT SHOWED TREES OF VARI-
OUS SIZE SHEARED AT DIFFERENT HEIGHTS. SALVAGE &
INVES WILL CONTINUE AFTER SNOW MELTS. PRIMARY CAUSE
UNDET, POSSIBLE PREFLT FAILURE OR PET DISORIENTA-
TION. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF COMPONENTS RECOVERED
DID NOT REVEAL MALFUNCTION OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN
DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.
UNDET- POSS MAT FAILURE/MAL UNDET COMP PORT ENG. POSS PE- EMERG OR UNUSUAL SITUATION DEVELOPED WHICH PLACED PLT BEYOND LIMITS OF HIS EXPER LEVEL. ENGINEERING A-
NALYSIS OF COMPONENTS RECOVERED DID NOT REVEAL MAL OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE IN DETERMINATION OF CAUSE.

CARD NO. 79 80

3	6
3	7
3	8
3	9
4	0
4	1
4	2
4	3
4	4
4	5
4	6
4	7
4	8
4	9
5	0
5	1
5	2
5	3
5	4
5	5
5	6
5	7
5	8
5	9

43
44
45
46
47

SND 4621 (Rev. 11/65)(Back)

DISPATCH CARD
A/C ACCIDENTS ONLY
(REV 4-65)

CODED EL DATE 4-7

LOGGED [illegible] DATE 4-7

PUNCHED RRB DATE 11 APR 66

SUBJECT	DON'T COUNT	ENEMY ACTION	OTHER AIRCRAFT	CARD COLUMNS
IDENTIFICATION	7	Φ4Φ	5 1 Φ	1	1-8
ACCIDENT DAMAGE				A	9
ACCIDENT INJURY				K	10
MODEL AIRCRAFT			- A 3 B		11-13
BUREAU NUMBER			1 3 8 9 1 7		16-21
REPORTING CUSTODIAN			2 9 8		22-24
TYPE DUTY				5	25
MAJOR COMMAND				1	26
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE				A	27
AIRCRAFT INJURY				K	28
TIME OF DAY				2	29
CARRIER HULL NO.					30
FIRST ACCIDENT TYPE			B	6	31-32
FIRST PHASE OF OPERATION			4 1		33-35
TYPE OF OPERATION			3		41-42
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTORS			Z		43-44
NUMBER "A" OR "L" OR "U" INJURIES			Φ	4	48-49
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS					62-65
PRIMARY CAUSE				2	67
DISPATCH CARD					74
FISCAL YEAR				7	75
MODEL CODE			Φ	1	76-77

IBM NOTE: Keypunch a "12" overpunch in card column 8 to denote other aircraft.

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

11/hs
Ser 325
25 March 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVAVNSAFECEN as UNDETERMINED with MATERIAL FAILURE (undetermined component of engine) and PILOT (emergency or unusual situation developed which placed pilot beyond limits of his experience level) as probable contributing factors.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 404) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
COMRCVW-12
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

Code 62/Pn
20 June 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NAVAVNSAFECEN INVESTIGATION 54-67

Ref: (a) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 282356Z April 1967
(b) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 191918Z April 1967
(c) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda 270102Z April 1967
(d) NAVAIRREWORKFAC NORIS 220118Z April 1967
(e) NAVAIRREWORKFAC Norfolk 042204Z May 1967

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The Accident. A-3B, BUNO 138917, assigned to HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE (VAH-123) and piloted by LCDR Richard Earl PARKS, USN, (b) (6) (b) crashed (ALFA) on a snow covered mountain at the 7000-foot level, at 1432(U), 5 April 1967, eight miles southeast of Alturas, California. The four occupants of the aircraft sustained fatal injuries in the crash. The crash site was in a U. S. Forest Preserve, and property damage was limited to broken trees.

b. Synopsis of Flight. The aircraft was enroute from NAS Miramar to NAS Whidbey Island on an instrument flight plan at Flight Level (FL) 180. Flight Level 220 had been requested, but was not available. The weather in the area was cumulus buildups with tops at FL 200. The assigned altitude, therefore, placed the aircraft in the clouds for at least some of the time. Moderate to occasionally severe turbulence was reported in the buildups. The aircraft was directed to change frequencies for hand-off from Oakland Center to Seattle Center, but no contact was made with Seattle Center. Radar contact was lost in the vicinity of Alturas, California, and search was initiated. The crash site was located by Forest Rangers.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

a. History

(1) Pilot. LCDR PARKS had 2821 total flight hours. He was a student replacement pilot in VAH-123 and had 25 hours in the A-3. The flight had been scheduled as an instrument check as a part of the syllabus training. He had 3.6 hours of instrument flight in the A-3 prior to departure from NAS

Whidbey Island the previous day. His previous experience was primarily in A-1H aircraft. His jet experience consisted of 72 hours. He held a special instrument rating and was considered well qualified for this flight.

(2) Instructor Pilot. LCDR Donald Edwin KING, USN, (b) (6) had 4209 total flight hours of which 1786 hours were in jet aircraft and 833 hours in the A-3.

(3) Plane Captain. Carl Virgil MILLER, ADJ3, USN, (b) (6) was a well qualified crewman with about 1100 hours in the A-3. He was probably in the fourth seat as it is the procedure for the plane captain to secure the hatch prior to taxiing.

(4) Passenger. LCDR James Merritt READER, USN, (b) (6) was a passenger enroute to NAS Whidbey Island for duty. His log books were aboard the aircraft and were not recovered. He was probably in the third crew position.

(5) Aircraft. BUNO 138917 was accepted on 28 December 1956 and had accumulated 3749 total hours. The sixth PAR was completed in October 1966 and 440 hours were subsequently flown. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and 246 hours were since flown.

(6) Engines

(a) J57-P-10, serial number P607625, had accumulated 2435 hours since acceptance. The fourth overhaul was completed on 9 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in February 1964 and verified during the last overhaul. This engine was installed on the port side.

(b) J57-P-10, serial number 632289, had accumulated 2076 hours since acceptance. The third overhaul was completed on 11 July 1966 at NAS North Island and the engine had since operated 440 hours. A calendar ODD inspection was completed on 19 January 1967 and the engine had since operated 246 hours. J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 was reported by reference (a) to have been incorporated in September 1965 and verified during the last overhaul. The engine was installed on the starboard side.

(7) Weather. The nearest weather reporting station was Klamath Falls, Oregon. At 1400 (U) the reported weather was 3000-foot ceiling with

light snow showers, temperature 40 degrees F, dewpoint 25 degrees F, with lowering ceilings. Cumulus buildups were to FL 200. The aeronautical weather at Alturas, California, nearby the crash site is unknown; however, persons on the ground recall the clouds to be well below the mountain peaks with occasional snow.

b. Field Investigation. The field investigation was hampered by a four-foot accumulation of snow. The location of parts was not practicable beyond the immediate impact area. The physical removal of heavy components required prodigious effort; and, upon removal of the engines, further salvage operations were postponed until the snow melted. Certain smaller engine accessories and airframe components were located and carried out by hand. Parts removed from the mountain were flown to the designated overhaul points for failure analysis.

c. Failure Analysis

(1) The airframe components were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC Alameda and the report of the analysis is reference (b) and amplified by reference (c). Pertinent findings of these analyses are:

(a) Both air turbine motors (ATM) were turning at impact.

(b) Aileron boost and surface control hydraulic pump, P/N AA 65319R6, showed no evidence of seizure.

(c) The remote attitude indicator (VGI) had the sphere distorted such that it appeared the impact attitude of the aircraft was vertical and tail down. While no correlation is suggested, it should be noted that a typical unit with power removed would assume the orientation observed in the damaged unit.

(d) One DC generator had indications of stationary axial impact. No evidence of rotation at impact was found on the armature.

(e) Wing fuel boost pump was running at impact.

(f) The emergency escape chute had not been fired. One recovered cartridge was tested and it fired within voltage and current limits.

(2) The engines and accessories were examined by NAVAIRREWORKFAC North Island, and the report of the priority disassembly inspection (PDIR)

is reference (d). The port engine was concluded to be stopped or at low RPM at impact. The starboard engine was rotating at impact. No indication of malfunction was found in the engine accessories. The engines were incomplete as recovered. The first, second, third, fifteenth stages of the port engine compressor were missing; with the fourth and sixteenth stages unattached. The first five spacers from the N1 compressor were missing. The first and second stages of the starboard engine were missing; with the third, fourth, and sixteenth stages unattached. The first, second, and fourth spacers from the N1 compressor were missing.

d. Other Investigation and Analysis

(1) NORAD radar was tracking BUNO 138917 along his route of flight. The computer readout indicated a ground speed of 443 knots and a steady track of 340°, along J-5 airway. At 1431.9(U) the readout suddenly changed to 396 knots and 327° track. Very shortly thereafter the radar return disappeared. The geographic plot of the point of lost radar contact by NORAD was 5 to 7 miles further along the track than the Seattle Center radar (located at Klamath Falls). The variation could be an indication of an electrical power loss causing the IFF to become inoperative and cause the center radar contact loss prior to the loss of the radar return by the NORAD radar. The speed loss and the course deviation were duplicated by a pilot of VAH-123 by an intentional sudden power reduction on one engine. The maneuver also resulted in a severe yaw which caused considerable control problems from which the pilot was able to recover under the existing VFR conditions.

(2) The combination of left course deviation observed by NORAD radar and the stopped or low RPM condition of the port engine led to concern about the possibility of failure or seizure of the port engine. During the course of the investigation, another mishap occurred in a VAH-10 aircraft, in the Caribbean area, which was operationally similar to the hypothesis formulated in this accident. This second mishap did not result in a crash. Two crewmen had bailed out while the aircraft was out of control. Upon reaching a low altitude the pilot successfully regained control and landed the aircraft. The starboard engine was found to have suffered severe damage in the compressor area and had extensive damage to the engine pod nose cowl. A PDIR was performed at NAVAIRREWORKFAC, Norfolk. Reference (e) is the report of this investigation and cites the cause of the engine failure to have been the use of the old type second stage compressor rotor two-rail spacer, P/N 206973, rather than the currently required three-rail spacer, P/N 366490. The engine log book indicated that J57 Engine Bulletin 535-A1 (new spacer) had been incorporated. As noted in 2c(2) above, this spacer has not been recovered from the crash site.

3. CONCLUSIONS

a. The cause of this accident is undetermined.

b. The possible cause is a loss of flight control due to severe yaw brought about by a failure of the port engine. An electrical power failure and temporary loss of hydraulic systems may have resulted from a pilot reaction to reduce power on the remaining starboard engine, causing the ATM's to fall below operating RPM. Such conditions in an instrument flight situation would render the aircraft uncontrollable due to the tumbled VGI, asymmetrical thrust, and limited hydraulic flight control. If, as in the VAH-10 mishap, the engine failure also caused compressor case and nose cowl damage, an undetermined but severe amount of asymmetrical drag would be experienced causing further control difficulty.

4. RECOMMENDATION. None, pending further salvage efforts which are planned when snow conditions permit.

Distribution:
List A
CNO (Op-05F)

DEPARTMEN[illegible] COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON OPERATIONAL REVIEW

NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT:

THE BOARDS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAGER FACTUAL INFORMATION AND MUCH CONJECTURE. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WILL REMAIN UNDETERMINED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY BE GLEANED FROM FURTHER INVESTIGATION, AS ADDITIONAL COMPONENTS MAY BE RECOVERED

LRB 221C

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:

The NAVAIRSYSCOM is having a study conducted to determine the feaseability of installing the YANKEE extraction System in the A3 type aircraft.

H.W.P./433

Concur with conclusions & recommendations of AAR & endorsers. [illegible]/42.

INITIAL/CODE

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to Correction to		Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3750-1			/
DIR			/
Misc. Items for Action or Correction			
To Code	From Code/Date		
	/		/
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Endorsements Reviewed and Acton Completed on All Phases of this Report.

UNIT VAH 123

MODEL A3B

BUNO 138917

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT ROUTING CODE/INIT			
	M&M		7-19-67	O				
	AERO MED	7-31-67	8-5-67					

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS

REMARKS

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC 14 FEB 1968 (10 working days)

EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT ROUTING	
A&R						

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

PRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&S	3-18-68	3-19-68	BS
2	M&M		3-15	
3	ADMIN			

3/19/68

ROUTING AFTER CLOSE OUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT ROUTING		
AERO MED						

NOTES
1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.
2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch
3. Any Department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

AIR-4041:WHH

25 JAN 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.

2. The A-3 YANKEE Extraction tests have been basically completed by the contractor. It has been determined that the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft is technically feasible. Final determination on the requirement, priority and funding for the installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in the A-3 aircraft will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMREADWINGCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
CO HATRON 123

1. REPORTING ACTIVITY	2. REPORT NO.	3. DATE OF D/I	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE AND PART NO.	ENGINE
NARF-316-SW NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300)	927	16 Nov 67	P/N 5380824-549 Horizontal stabilizer actuator	

5. ASSEMBLY (Model)	6. ASSEMBLY (Serial)	7. ASSEMBLY MFR	8. DATE REMOVED	9. REMOVED FROM (Eng Mod)	10. REMOVED FROM (Eng Ser)
		88277			

11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW	12. HRS SINCE LAST O/H	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO. PREV O/H'S	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)	17. AIRCRAFT (BUNO)
Unknown	Unknown				A-3B	138917

18. OPERATING ACTIVITY	19. FUR/SFR/AAR/IFR/SA	20. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE
VAH-123		Accident/incident damage 4B

21. FINDINGS: [0 X] NO DISCREPANCY; [B] BASIC (MFG/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY; [N] NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY; [F] FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.) | COND | ZONE

23. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.) | COND

24. PERTINENT BULLETINS, CHANGES, ETC. INCORPORATED — NUMBER | YES | NO

25. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)

Ref: (a) VAH-123 msg 252314Z Oct 1967
(b) NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA DIR 854 of 18 Jul 1967

a. A remaining part of the horizontal stabilizer actuator was recovered as reported by reference (a). This part was received for DIR as a continuation of reference (b), which reported the actuator was jammed by crash impact in approximately the neutral position.

b. Only the lower mounting portion comprising the housing assembly P/N 5380909-501 was received. The transmitter, AC motor assembly P/N XA30525 and DC motor assembly P/N D949 were torn away by crash impact and missing.

c. Disassembly disclosed no discrepancies other than those caused by crash impact.

PRIORITY

26.	REQUESTED BY	REFERENCE	25.	
[X] PRIORITY DIR	NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC msg 310110Z Oct 67.	Control No. 3282-67.	GMEE 114	APPLICABLE / INCORPORATED

	31. TITLE	32. DATE
[redacted]	WEAPONS SYSTEMS ENGR DIV HEAD	30 November 1967

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT/NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 4730-2

27. CONCLUSIONS: There is no evidence to indicate this portion of the actuator was not operating satisfactorily prior to crash impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

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COMNAVAIRPAC
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VAH-123
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
NAVAIREWORKFAC QUONPT
NAVAIREWORKFAC JAX

704051

3750
Ser 80/ 3397

8 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6E

1. Readdressed and forwarded for NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ comments concerning the recommendation contained in Part X concerning installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft.

2. The conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, are concurred with.

3. The first endorsement does not show complete copy to distribution. By copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer, VAH-123 is requested to ensure complete copy to distribution in accordance with subparagraph 4d(1) of reference (a).

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMREADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
CO HATRON 123

3750
Ser 80/ 3897

8 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A concerning A-3B BuNo 138917 accident occurring 5 April 1967, pilot PARKS

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: VAH-123 AAR ser 1-67A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6E

1. Readdressed and forwarded for NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ comments concerning the recommendation contained in Part X concerning installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft.

2. The conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements, are concurred with.

3. The first endorsement does not show complete copy to distribution. By copy of this endorsement, the Commanding Officer, VAH-123 is requested to ensure complete copy to distribution in accordance with subparagraph 4(h) of reference (a).

(b) (6)

[redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMREADATKCARAIRWING 12
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
CO HATRON 123

Code 015-ee
3750
Ser: 678

2 JUN 1967

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 AAR Ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A-3B BUNO 138917, Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the comments and recommendations of the Board as modified by the first two endorsements, except as noted below.

2. Insufficient evidence exists to include pilot deviation from NATOPS procedures as a contributing cause factor. The starboard engine was operating near the idle range; however, the reason for this is a matter of conjecture.

3. Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey concurs in the need of an extraction system for A-3 crew members. The number of possible saves for Whidbey based aircraft are correctly stated in the second endorsement. These do not include combat losses.

4. Plans for further investigation at the crash site are being made. It is estimated that the snow will have receded enough by 1 July to permit access to the area.

J. A. [illegible]
RAdm

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREP LBEACH
HATRON ONE TWO THREE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

COMFCVW-12:bd
3750
Ser 80/330
23 MAY 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967, A3B BUNO 138917 Pilot PARKS

From: Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing TWELVE
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board as modified by the remarks of the first endorser and with the following comments:

a. Exception is taken to the unsubstantiated remarks made by the medical officer in paragraph VII A.3. in the conclusions of his report. A review of the accident statistics for A3 aircraft reveals this is the third accident in 40 months in which an ejection system could have conceivably prevented fatal injuries. In one of these cases an ejection system with at least a "zero - zero", capability would have been required. This is not to say that an ejection system for A3 aircraft is not an urgent requirement. This endorser certainly recognizes the need for an escape system for crew members of all high speed/high performance aircraft. However, it is the opinion of this endorser that conclusions, and recommendations must be made from, a basis of fact, and not from an emotional viewpoint.

2. It is noted that the instructor pilot for this flight had last completed the NATOPS Standardization Check on 8/14/64. Subsequent investigation reveals a sagging emphasis on this point in that two instructor pilots of VAH-123 are overdue for NATOPS qualification checks. It is further noted that a program, whereby each instructor is checked for NATOPS standardization in conjunction with his annual examination for proficency in instrument flying, has been initiated. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE is directed to insure the standardization of each instructor, in accordance with current directives at the earliest possible date.

3. It is further noted that section A.19. of the Aircraft Accident Report Form 3750-1 should be changed to reflect altitude 7200 feet above mean sea level and zero feet above terrain.

R. E. Gallatin

R. E. GALLATIN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

Copy to:
CO, VAH-123
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS

VAH-123/JPS:dwc
3750
Ser 00/ 868
12 MAY 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VAH-123 ser 1-67 of 5 April 1967 A3B BUNO 138917 Pilot PARKS

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron One Two Three
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing Twelve
(2) Commander Fleet Air, Whidbey
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board with the following exceptions:

a. Concur. Although it cannot be determined why the crew made no effort to abandon the aircraft, it must be re-emphasized that bailout is the proper course of action when faced with an emergency at altitudes less than 10,000 feet above the terrain. This is the NATOPS procedure and is taught to all A-3 flight crews. It will be continually re-emphasized at all crew meetings.

b. Do not concur. Flight crews must always be aware of the type of terrain below their aircraft. This information is available on other charts and its inclusion on the enroute FLIP charts would detract from what now is a highly useable inflight chart.

c. Do not concur. [redacted] (b) (5)

d. Concur.

e. Concur. All possible efforts will be made to recover further wreckage and ascertain additional facts concerning the accident. Any new developments will be forwarded when available.

2. The board's conclusions and recommendations are based on a meager amount of factual evidence and much conjecture. The possibilities are almost limitless and the actual factors may never be determined. The port engine failure by itself would not cause the accident, but the action taken by the pilot or the instructor could have aggravated the emergency.

3. An examination of LCDR PARKS flight log shows that he had not been involved in a previous pilot caused accident.

4. The last COMNAVAIRPAC Accident Prevention Survey was completed on 30 March 1967

J. P. SUNDBERG

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

To: Commander, U S Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Supplementary Accident Data concerning VAH-123 AAR serial 1-67A, A3B BUNO 138917 occurring 5 April 1967, Pilot PARKS, Instructor Pilot KING
submission of

Ref: (a) NASC ltr ser: 50/B155 of 19 APR 1967

Encl: (1) Supplementary Accident Data Form for subject accident pages 1 through 5 & 1-3
(2) Reproduction of subject pilot's log covering month of accident and two (2) preceding calendar months and co-pilot's.
(3) [illegible]
(4) [illegible]

1. As requested by reference (a), the enclosures are forwarded.

J. P. SUNDBERG

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SUPPLEMENTARY ACCIDENT DATA

In addition to answering the following questions, enclose a duplicate of the pilot's log covering the month in which the accident occurred as well as the preceding two calendar months.

1. Date of mishap: year 1967 month APRIL day 5
2. Aircraft model A-3B
3. Bureau Number of aircraft 138917
4. Reporting custodian VAH-123
5. Pilot file number 584656
6. Branch of service: Marine ____ Navy X
7. Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing (RCVW) trained? Yes ____ No X
   UNDERGOING RCVW TRAINING WHEN ACCIDENT occurred.
   If Yes, date completed / /
   RCVW Squadron VAH 123
8. Percentage of training completed if in a formal training status 25%
9. Length of time (mo.) in present squadron 9mo
10. Pilot currently qualified in following aircraft (model and series)

A3B TF9J ____ ____ ____

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR PARKS

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KIND OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
3-1-67	A-3B	138959	1A1	1.2		1.2	0.2 A					F-1
3-9-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	1.8	0.7					1 T A	F-1
3-11-67	A-3B	142251	1A1	2.1	2.1		0.5 A			8	1TA,3GA	F-2
3-13-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.7 A			6	1TA,1RA, 2GA	F-3
3-18-67	A-3B	138921	1A1	2.3	2.3		0.4 A			8	5JGA,1JGA	F-4
3-21-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.7	1.7		0.5 A			10	1TA,2GA	F-5X
3-24-67	A-3B	138906	1A1	2.4	2.4		0.3 A			8	3GA,1RA	F-6
3-27-67	A-3B	142251	1A2	2.0	2.0					6	1TA,3GA	F-7
3-29-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	2.1	2.1				2.1	6	1TA,2GA	F-9
3-30-67	A-3B	138917	1A1	2.7	2.7		0.5 A			2	1TA,1RA, 1GA	F-8
3-30-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	1.4	1.4		0.5 A		1.4	4	1RA,4GA	F-10
4-3-67	A-3B	138917	1A2	2.2	2.2			2.0S		1	1RA,1TA, 2GA	I-1
TOTAL				25.1								

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR PARKS

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KIND OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
3-1-67	A-3B	138959	1A1	1.2		1.2	0.2 A					F-1
3-9-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	1.8	0.7					1 T A	F-1
3-11-67	A-3B	142251	1A1	2.1	2.1		0.5 A			8	1TA,3GA	F-2
3-13-67	A-3B	138932	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.7 A			6	1TA,1RA, 2GA	F-3
3-18-67	A-3B	138921	1A1	2.3	2.3		0.4 A			8	5JGA,1JGA	F-4
3-21-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.7	1.7		0.5 A			10	1TA,2GA	F-5X
3-24-67	A-3B	138906	1A1	2.4	2.4		0.3 A			8	3GA,1RA	F-6
3-27-67	A-3B	142251	1A2	2.0	2.0					6	1TA,3GA	F-7
-29-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	2.1	2.1				2.1	6	1TA,2GA	F-9
	A-3B	138917	1A1	2.7	2.7		0.5 A			2	1TA,1RA, 1GA	F-8
3-30-67	A-3B	138917	3A1	1.4	1.4		0.5 A		1.4	4	1RA,4GA	F-10
4-3-67	A-3B	138917	1A2	2.2	2.2			2.0S		1	1RA,1TA, 2GA	I-1
TOTAL				25.1								

11. a. Specify training time (hrs.) with reference to date of mishap as follows:

	WST		OFT		CPT		LINK
	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	
Previous 12 months	___	___	9	UNK	___	___	___
Previous 6 months	___	___	9	UNK	___	___	___
Previous 3 months	___	___	9	Ø	___	___	___
Previous 1 month	___	___	9	Ø	___	___	___

If training time in this model during previous three months was less than 3 hours in Weapons Systems Trainer (WST), Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), or Cockpit Training (CPT), indicate reason by checking appropriate spaces in part b.

b.

	WST	OFT	CPT	LINK
(1) Pilot deployed	___	___		___
(2) Trainer not in area (station ___)	___	___		___
(3) Down for maintenance	___	___		___
(4) Not available due to trainer schedule	___	___		___
(5) Lack of trainer personnel	___	___		___
(6) Not available due to pilot's schedule	___	___	___	___
(7) Other reasons (specify):				
___	___	___	___	___
___	___	___	___	___

Co-Pilot Form

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SUPPLEMENTARY ACCIDENT DATA

In addition to answering the following questions, enclose a duplicate of the co-pilot's log covering the month in which the accident occurred as well as the preceding two calendar months.

1. Date of mishap: year 1967 month APRIL day ~~4~~ 5
2. Aircraft model A-3B
3. Bureau Number of aircraft 138917
4. Reporting custodian VAH-123
5. Co-pilot ~~XXX~~ file number 575768
6. Branch of service: Marine ____ Navy X
7. Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing (RCVW) trained? Yes X No ____

   If Yes, date completed 8 AUG 61

   RCVW Squadron VAH-123
8. Percentage of training completed if in a formal training status ____
9. Length of time (mo.) in present squadron 16mo
10. Co-pilot ~~XXX~~ currently qualified in following aircraft (model and series)

    A-3B A-6A ____ ____ ____

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR KING

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KING OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
2-3-67	A-6A	152621	1A1	2.5	2.5		1.0 A 1.0 S		1	1JRA	BNAV-2
2-6-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.6	2.6		0.1 A 1.0 S		1	1JRS	
2-6-67	TA-3B	144856	1A1	4.1	4.1		1.4 A 3.0 S		1	1JRA	RN-3
2-9-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.3	2.3		1.0 A 1.0 S		1	1JRA	
2-14-67	A-6A	152616	1A1	2.5	2.5				1		
2-17-67	A-3B	138944	1R2	2.6	2.6				1	1JTS	NKX
2-23-67	A-3B	142364	3A4	3.8		3.8		3.8			
2-27-67	TA-3B	144867	1A1	2.0	2.0		0.5 A		1		RN-2
3-6-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.5		1.5					
3-7-67	A-6A	152617	1A1	2.1	2.1				1	1AS	
3-9-67	A-6A	152622	1A1	5.0	2.5	2.5	0.5 A 1.0 S		1	1GA	NWW MIRAMAR
3-10-67	A-3B	142744	1A1	1.4		1.4	1.5 A 0.5 S		4	2GA,2TA	
3-13-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	1.9		1.9					
3-15-67	A-6A	152901	1A7	2.0	2.0		0.5		1		
3-14-67	A-6A	152613	1A7	2.6	2.6		0.5 A 1.0 S		1	1RS	BWPS ING

AVIATORS FLIGHT LOG BOOK
LCDR KING
(CONT)

DAY	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER	KING OF FLIGHT CODE	TOTAL PILOT TIME	FIRST PILOT	CO-PILOT	INST TIME DAY	INST TIME NIGHT	NIGHT VFR TIME	OTHER LAND OR SEA	STD INST APPR COMPLETED	REMARKS
3-22-67	A-3B	138906	3A4	0.4		0.4						COA-64
3-22-67	A-3B	138921	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.7 A	1.0 S		1	1RA	NKX
3-16-67	A-3B	142634	1A1	3.0		3.0	1.0 A					NKX
3-27-67	A-3B	138917	1A2	1.9	0.4	1.5				2		
3-29-67	A-6A	152615	1A1	2.5	2.5		0.1			1		BNAV-4
4-1-67	A-6A	152900	1A7	2.3	2.3		0.1 A			1		NWW NWW
4-3-67	A-6A	152623	1A7	2.2	2.2					1		BDM
4-4-67	A-6A	152623	1A1	2.7	1.5	1.2	0.2			3	1GA	PFAM-1
TOTAL				56.4								

Co-Pilot Form

11. a. Specify training time (hrs.) with reference to date of mishap as follows:

	WST		OFT		CPT		LINK
	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	This model	All other models	
Previous 12 months							
Previous 6 months							
Previous 3 months							
Previous 1 month							

If training time in this model during previous three months was less than 3 hours in Weapons Systems Trainer (WST), Operational Flight Trainer (OFT), or Cockpit Training (CPT), indicate reason by checking appropriate spaces in part b.

b.

	WST	OFT	CPT	LINK
(1) Pilot deployed				
(2) Trainer not in area (station _____)				
(3) Down for maintenance				
(4) Not available due to trainer schedule				
(5) Lack of trainer personnel				
(6) Not available due to pilot's schedule		X		
(7) Other reasons (specify):				
_____				
_____				

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12. [redacted]

[redacted] ____

13. Commanding Officer's rating of co-pilot's ability: Superior X

Average ____ Below Average ____

14. [redacted]

a. [redacted] ____

b. [redacted] ____

15. [redacted]

a. [redacted] ____

b. [redacted] ____

c. [redacted] ____

16. [redacted] ____

[redacted]

17. [redacted] ____

[redacted]

18. [redacted] ____

[redacted] ____

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

12. If flight was a maintenance test flight, was pilot designated by Commanding Officer as qualified maintenance test pilot? Yes ____ No ____

13. Commanding Officer's rating of pilot's ability: Superior ____ Average X Below Average ____

14. Length of time (mo.) Commanding Officer

a. Has been aboard 3MO

b. Has been in command of this squadron 3MO

15. Estimate of total time (hrs.) involved in accident investigation by:

a. Accident board members 788

b. Wreckage recovery and salvage 710

c. Supporting Personnel 1220

16. Best estimate of operation and maintenance funds expended for investigation and salvage (e.g. civilian salaries, O&R cost, equipment rental, etc.) $23.00

Attach itemized breakdown. GASOLINE ——— 12.50
BLACK IRON PIPE- 10.50
$23.00

17. Did funding cause a delay in wreckage recovery? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, how long? ____ (days)

18. Was equipment for wreckage recovery adequate? Yes X No ____

If No, list deficiencies. ____

WRECKAGE RECOVERY LIMITED BY WEATHER AND DENSE SNOW COVER. LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS PROVIDED MUCH ASSISTANCE AT NO COST.

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

19. Number of accident board members 4

20. Specify number of accident board members who have attended the following schools:

a. Safety Officer's School, USC 0

b. Safety Officer's School, Monterey 0

c. Safety Center 5-day ASO School 1

d. Monterey Baccalaureate Curriculum Safety Course 0

e. SEE BELOW

f. None of the above ____

21. Specify by checking if the:

	Manufacturer's Technical Reps			Manufacturer's Engineers		
	Requested	were Available	Utilized	Requested	were Available	Utilized
Airframe	____	X	X	____	X	X
Engine	____	X	X	____	X	X
Other	____	____	____	____	____	____

22. Was pre-accident plan adequate? Yes X No ____

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INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE[4] WAS PROVIDED BY
AVIATION SAFETY CENTER REPRESENTATIVE
COMFAIRWHIDBEY AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER
VAH-123 A-6 AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER
ALL GRADUATES OF SAFETY OFFICERS SCHOOL, USC

23. Did previous training adequately prepare the accident board for its duties?

Yes X No ___

(If answer to questions 22 or 23 is No, please make comments)

COMMENTS:

24. Has the command submitted any previous recommendation that included factors similar to those associated with this mishap? Yes X No ___

COMMENTS:

THIS COMMAND HAS MADE MANY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOME EJECTION SEAT ESCAPE CAPABILITY AND CONTINUES TO DO SO. THE NEED FOR AN O ESCAPE SYSTEM IS REEMPHASIZED BY THIS MISHAP.

1. Reporting Activity	2. Report No.	3. Date of D/I	4. Assembly Nomenclature and Part No.	Engine
NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS	31	5-9-67		X

5. Assembly (Model)	6. Assembly (Serial)	7. Assembly MFR	8. Date Removed	9. Removed From (Eng Mod)	10. Removed From (Eng Ser)
J57-P10	P607625 & P632289	77445	4-5-67	-----	-----

11. Total Hrs Since New	12. Hrs Since Last O/H	13. Date Last O/H	14. Last Overhaul Activity	15. No. Prev. O/H's	16. Aircraft (Model)	17. Aircraft (BUNO)
See Page 2	See Page 2		NAS NORIS	See Page 2	A3B	138917

18. Operating Activity	19. TUR/IFR/AAR/UR/FM/QA	20. Reason for Removal and Code
VAH-123	AAR-1-67A	Aircraft Accident 4B

21. Findings: O [X] No Discrepancy; B [ ] Basic (MFG/Design) Discrepancy; N [ ] Non-Basic (Maint/Oper) Discrepancy; F [ ] Foreign Object Damage

22. Primary Part Failure (Part No.) | Cond | Zone

26. Description of Findings (Include cause and part no. of primary part failure) See attached sheets.

23. Discrepant Parts (Part No.) | Cond

Distribution:

NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-4113/53613/4012/504)
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMNAVAIRLANT
NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
COMFAIRWHIDBEY
COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
HATRON ONE TWO THREE

NAVPLANTREPO L. BEACH
NAVPLANTREPO E. HARTFORD
NAVAIREWORKFAC NORVA
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT

Local Dist:
1000
400
6000
PWA Representative

24. Pertinent Bulletins, Changes, etc. Incorporated

Number	Yes	No
E.B. 535-A1	X	

27. Conclusions

See attached sheets.

AAR
060300Z Apr

28. Recommendations

See attached sheets.

29. [X] Priority D/R — Requested by: NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC Control No. 3282-67 131804Z Apr '67 — Reference

25. Oper. Hrs — Applicable / Incorporated

(b) (6) [redacted]

31. Title: Weapons Engineering Department Supt. — 32. Date: 5/11/67

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) — REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 4730-2

332
SHB:lvb

NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31

NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 1318042 April 1967 Control No. 3282-67 requested a failure analysis on J57-P10 engines, Serial Nos. P607625 and P632289, removed from A3B aircraft BUNO 138917, due to an aircraft accident. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS 2201182 and 2823562 April 1967 refer.

26. Description of Findings:

Supplemental Data to Form 4730/2

Engine Serial No. P607625

11. Total hours since new - 2864.5

12. Hours since last overhaul - 439.7

13. Date last overhaul - 18 July 1966

15. No.of previous overhauls - (4)

Engine Serial No. P632289

11. Total hours since new - 2076.1

12. Hours since last overhaul - 439.7

13. Date last overhaul - 19 July 1966

15. No. of previous overhauls - (3)

a. Visual inspection revealed that both engines had suffered major impact-type damage. Engine rotating components were found severed into five sections, as shown in enclosure (1).

b. Examination of damaged parts from L/H engine S/N P607625, i.e., N_1 and N_2 compressors, as shown in enclosures (2) and (3), respectively, revealed that the compressor blades were relatively straight and negligible rotor rotation was in evidence, indicating that engine speed was low RPM or rotors stopped at impact.

(1) Examination of the third and second stage turbine discs, as shown in enclosure (4), substantiates further that rotor speed of engine S/N P607625, was low RPM or stopped at impact, as indicated by the blade tip bending and absence of rotational rub marks.

(2) A review of the N_1 and N_2 compressors and discs of engine S/N P607625, revealed that Nos. 1, 2, and 3 discs were missing; No. 4 disc was found unattached; No. 5 disc was missing; Nos. 6 through 14 discs were found assembled together; No. 15 disc was missing and No. 16 disc was found unattached.

704051 - -

332
SHB:lvb

NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31

c. Examination of damaged compressor parts of R/H engine S/N P632289, indicated rotor rotation at impact. Engine speed was probably in the idle RPM range, as disclosed by the anti-rotation right-angle bending and clipped-off N_1 and N_2 compressor blades shown in enclosure (5).

d. The No. 1 main bearings were missing from both engines. All other main bearings of both engines were examined and found to have operated satisfactorily prior to suffering impact damage.

e. Those parts of engine, S/N P607625 and P632289 affected by E.B. 535-A1 were not received; therefore, inspection could not verify physical incorporation of this bulletin.

f. Research of history data indicates:

(1) Engine S/N P607625 - NORIS shops engine assembly records indicate J57 E.B. 535-Amendment 1 incorporation was certified 9 July 1966; NAVWEPS Form 13090/40 indicates incorporation of J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 by NORIS on 3 February 1964 and certification of incorporation by NORIS on 9 July 1966.

(2) Engine S/N P632289 - NORIS shops engine assembly records indicate J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 incorporation was certified 11 July 1966; NAVWEPS Form 13090/40 indicates incorporation of J57 E.B. 535 Amendment 1 by NORIS on 25 September 1965 and certification of incorporation by NORIS on 11 July 1966.

g. Accessories:

(1) The pressurizing and dump valve removed from engine S/N P607625 was disassembled and examined without testing, because of impact damage; no indication of malfunction was found.

(2) The upper body group of one unidentified fuel control was received. These parts were examined; no indication of malfunction was found.

27. Conclusions:

a. Engine S/N P607625 was stopped or at low RPM at impact. Engine S/N P632289 was rotating at impact, probably in the idle RPM range.

b. Examination and analysis of engine components as received revealed no indications of malfunction.

28. Recommendations: None.

Encl: (1) NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS Photo No. LAA-34898
(2) " " " " " -34897
(3) " " " " " -34895
(4) " " " " " -34899
(5) " " " " " -34896









ENCL 6

NNNNZCZCNASC729CSLA038
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5959 2002204-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 192204Z JUL 67
FM NAVACREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCRARIWING ONE TWO
RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/504/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 280121Z JUN 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO. 3282-67 REQ AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS ON MAIN FUEL CONTROL, P/N 507650-L16, S/N 20112, REMOVED FROM ONE ENGINE OF SUBJ

729/67

Cog MTM Records

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA5959 UNCLAS
A/C.
2. INVESTIGATION REVEALED:
   A. FUEL CONTROL SUFFERED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
   B. CONTROL MECHANISMS (CONTROL SHAFT, LINKAGE, BRACKET, AND LEVER ASSY, ETC.) WERE MISSING.
   C. FUEL STRAINERS WERE CLEAN.
   D. PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE - CLOSED POSITION (NORMAL). NO DISCREPANCIES.
   E. FLYWEIGHT GOVERNOR ASSY - NO DISCREPANCIES.
   F. CYLINDER CAM SPEED SENSOR - NO DISCREPANCIES.
3. CONCLUDE: DETERMINATION OF FUEL CONTROL OPERABILITY OR MALFUNCTION PRIOR TO IMPACT NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO MUTILATED CONDITON OF PARTS.
4. THIS IS A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31 OF 12 MAY 1967.
BT

JUL 1922QZ

A3B 138917

704051--

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	2. REPORT NO.	3. DATE OF D/I	4. ASSEMBLY NOMENC. AND PART NO.	ENGINE
NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300)	854	12 Jul 67	P/N 5380824-549 Horizontal stabilizer actuator	

5. ASSEMBLY (Model)	6. ASSEMBLY (Serial)	7. ASSEMBLY MFR	8. DATE REMOVED	9. REMOVED FROM (Eng Mod)	10. REMOVED FROM (Eng Ser)
		88277			

11. TOTAL HRS SINCE NEW	12. HRS SINCE LAST O/H	13. DATE LAST O/H	14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	15. NO. PREV O/H'S	16. AIRCRAFT (Model)	17. AIRCRAFT (BUNO)
Unknown	Unknown				A-3B	138917

18. OPERATING ACTIVITY	19. FUR-EFR - AAR - I/FH/GA	20. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE
HATRON-123		Accident/Incident Damage 4B

21. FINDINGS

O [ ] NO DISCREPANCY B [ ] BASIC (MFG/DESIGN) DISCREPANCY N [ ] NON-BASIC (MAINT/OPER) DISCREPANCY F [ ] FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

22. PRIMARY PART FAILURE (Part No.) | COND. | TIME

23. DISCREPANT PARTS (Part No.) | COND.

24. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name and part no. of primary part failure)

Only the top mounting portion of the actuator was received at this Facility. It consisted of a fractured ball screw assembly and a damaged ball nut P/N 5660-2. These parts were jammed in position by crash impact. This position corresponded with the approximately neutral position or zero degree trim of the actuator.

25. PERTINENT BULLETINS, CHANGES, ETC. INCORPORATED

NUMBER	YES	NO

27. CONCLUSIONS

Actuator was in approximately neutral position or zero degree trim during impact.

28. RECOMMENDATIONS

None.

29. PRIORITY DIR	REQUESTED BY	REFERENCE	29. SPEC 114	APPLICABLE / INCORPORATED
[ ]	NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 280121Z Jun 67. Control 3282-67.			

30. SIGNATURE	31. TITLE	32. DATE
(b) (6)	WEAPONS SYSTEMS ENGR DIV HEAD	18 July 1967

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVWEPS FORM 4730/2 (11-61) REPORT SYMBOL BUWEPS 4730-2

DISTRIBUTION:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR-4113) (AIR-4041)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
HATRON-123
NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
NAVAIREWORKFAC QUONPT
NAVAIREWORKFAC JAX

704051 - -

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with
Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART 1 GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, HATRON-123	1-67A	051431U APR	A-3B	138917

6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center

7. VIA Commander Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing Twelve
Commander Fleet Air Whidbey
Commander Naval Air Force Pacific

9. LOCATION OF MISHAP	10. DAMAGE
41-17 N/120-16 W	ALFA

11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE
AFTERNOON	1 + 15	1A1

14. CLEARED FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY

15. TYPE CLEARANCE	16. AIRSPEED	17. A/C WEIGHT
IFR	450 E	56,000 (EST)

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: AIRCRAFT COLLISION WITH GROUND

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: SL 7,200 TERRAIN 7,200

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
	1 PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9 SERVICING PERSONNEL	X	17 WEATHER
X	2 PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10 LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18 DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3 PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11 OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*		19 DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4 PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*		12 ADMINISTRATIVE		20 DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
	5 CREW		13 FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21 ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14 FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)	X	22 MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15 FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*	X	23 UNDETERMINED
	8 SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)*		16 FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*		24 OTHER *(Specify)*

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. RANK/RATE	3. FILE/SERVICE NO	4.	5. SOURCE OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7.	8. PILOT	9. POSITION	10. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap): PARKS, Richard E.	LCDR	(b) (6) [redacted]		USN	35	11 YRS	FRP	PILOT	A
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1): KING, Donald E.	LCDR			USN	36	14 YRS	INST PILOT	B/N	A

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11 ALL MODELS		2821	17 CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	362 / 109
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12 ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		153	18 FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	0 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13 ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		25	19 INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	4 / 2
				IN MODEL	4 / 2
14 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	25	20 NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	4 /
	OFT/CPT	9 / NA		IN MODEL	4 /
15 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	25	21 TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap)		72
	OFT/CPT	9 / NA			
16 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	25	22 LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	4 April 1967
	OFT/CPT	9 / NA		DURATION	3
23 DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		NONE	24 TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26.	27. RANK/RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. PILOT	33. POSITION
MILLER, Carl V. Jr.		ADJ3	USN	(b) (6) [redacted]		FATAL	P/C	COCKPIT
READER, James M.	XX	LCDR	USN		VF-126	FATAL	PAX	COCKPIT

OP-OSF

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev 3-[illegible]) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED *in accordance with Para 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION [illegible].6, effective edition*

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I GENERAL

SECTION A: IDENTIFICATION

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2. SERIAL NO.	3. DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT	5. BUREAU NUMBER
CO, HATRON-123	1-67A	051431U APR	A-3B	138917

6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center

7. VIA:	8.	11. TIME OF DAY	12. TIME IN FLIGHT	13. FLIGHT CODE

9. LOCATION OF MISHAP

10. DAMAGE

14. CLEARED FROM: TO:

15. TYPE CLEARANCE

16. AIRSPEED

17. A/C WEIGHT

18. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP

19. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

S.L. TERRAIN

20. LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED *(Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)*

SECTION B: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

FACTOR	FACTOR	FACTOR
1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	17. WEATHER
2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11. OTHER PERSONNEL *(Specify)*	19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
4. PILOT OTHER *(Specify)*	12. ADMINISTRATIVE	20. DESIGN OTHER *(Specify)*
5. CREW	13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK	21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK, ROUGH SEAS
6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR *(Ship or field)*	23. UNDETERMINED
8. SUPERVISORY OTHER *(Specify)*	16. FACILITIES OTHER *(Specify)*	24. OTHER *(Specify)*

1. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2. GRADE	3. SERVICE NO.	4. DESIGNATOR	5. BRANCH OF SERVICE	6. AGE	7. FLIGHT EXP (yrs)	8. BILLET	9. POSITION	10. FLIGHT STATUS
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap)									
CO-PILOT (identify & submit separate page 1) KING, Donald E.	LCDR	(b) (6)		USN	36	14 YRS	INST PILOT	B/N	

SECTION C: PERSONNEL DATA

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM		TOTAL	ITEM		TOTAL
11. ALL MODELS		4209	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	NIGHT	180 / UNK
				IN MODEL	UNK / UNK
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		413	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	74 / 112
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		92	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	8 / 10
				IN MODEL	4 / 5
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	833	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	5
	OFT/CPT	UNK / UNK		IN MODEL	5
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	182	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap)		1786
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0			
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	43	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	4 April 1967
	OFT/CPT	0 / 0		DURATION	3
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		8/24/66 QUAL	24. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		SPEC

OTHER PERS

25. NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26. GRADE	27. SERVICE NO.	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FULL SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. FLIGHT STATUS	32. BILLET	33. POSITION

OPNAV 3750-1A

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with — OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 2 — *Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition*

A. A/C HISTORY — PART II MAINTENANCE MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT HRS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
28 Dec 56	3748.9	6	6	439.7	NAS ALAMEDA	CAL. ODD	246.3	79

B. ENGINE HISTORY

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	6. FLT HRS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)	J-57 P-10	P607 625	2434.7	4	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(2)	J-57 P-10	P632 289	2076.1	3	YES	439.7	NAS NORIS	CAL. ODD	246.3	79
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS ON PART	4. NO. OF OVERHAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. WAS DIR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FUR/AMPEUR
(1)	ATM 78P-247	352040-0-4	1746.2	2	543.6	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(2)	ATM PX-44-175	352030-0-2	1883.9	5	453.7	NAS ALAMEDA	YES	
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

1. PARTS REPAIRED — PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED — PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE
	18,000'	360K EST	UNK	UNK	LEVEL FLT	UNK	LEVEL

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL	14. NO. RELIGHT ATTEMPTS
UNK	☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED				☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS
UNK	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/BMEP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. AMPEUR SERIAL NUMBER
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP VAH-123 110345Z — *Refer NAVAIR on DIR request. See para. 36 OPNAVINST 3750.6A*
3. OTHER
4.

OP-2397

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev.)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, effective edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: CATAPULT / ARRESTING GEAR	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND BRIDLE ARRESTER —	
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING ...	...OF NON-STANDARD ... USED			

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (PSI)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/BARRICADE							

H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY ___ OUTSIDE AIR ___	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate)

See weather enclosure.

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
		-	Time extension granted by CNAP 202226Z APR 67	2CC NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT (AAR)
				1CC BUWEPS DIRECT (MAR)
				1CC COMNAVAIRPAC
				1CC COMFAIRWHIDBEY
				1CC COMRCVW-12
				1CC PLANT REPO LONG BEACH

COST DAMAGE TO	3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	4. PRIVATE PROPERTY	5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO
	Various trees of unknown value	NONE	5 MAY 1967

PART IV SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. [redacted] OPERATIONS OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)	2. [redacted] AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)
3. [redacted] FLIGHT SURGEON	3. [redacted] MATERIAL OFFICER (UNIT BILLET)

** When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

GPO-05F

V THE ACCIDENT

On 5 April A3B BUNO 138917, NJ309, departed NAS Miramar at 1316 local for NAS Whidbey Island via Bakersfield, J-5 Seattle direct NAS Whidbey at flight level 220, airspeed 450 knots TAS. The flight progressed normally, deviating from filed flight level to 180. At 1428 approximately 95 nautical miles SSE of Lakeview VORTAC Oakland Center advised 138917 to contact Seattle Center on frequency 306.3 MCS. This transmission was acknowledged with no statement of difficulty. At 1430 the aircraft reported at flight level 180 to Seattle Center but did not acknowledge when subsequently requested to SQUAWK IDENT. At 1431 Seattle Center observed the aircraft make an abrupt left deviation from flight track and disappear from radar at 41 - 27N, 120 - 15W.

Agencies concerned were alerted at this time and at 1630 search and rescue attempts were initiated by Air Rescue Center at Hamilton AFB. At approximately 1430 a witness 8½ miles from the scene heard an explosion and observed smoke. He subsequently notified the MODOC county sheriff in Alturas, California. Search and rescue aircraft maintained a vigil over the scene throughout the remainder of the day and all during the night. Search efforts were hampered by dense cloud cover and restricted visibility in snow showers. The following morning, 6 April 1967, the MODOC county sheriff in a light civil aircraft visually spotted the wreckage at 41° - 17'N, 120° - 16'W. The wreckage was located on the western side of the Warner Mountain range at 7400' level amidst a forested area with snow depths approximately 4 - 6 feet (see enclosure 2). Coincidentally, a ground party of two U. S. Forest Rangers assigned to the Modoc National Forest reached the scene via snow tractor and established that there were no survivors at the wreckage site. A navy flight surgeon, dropped by helo later during the day, verified that there were no survivors at the crash scene. On 8 April the navy aircraft accident investigative team from VAH-123 established that all four occupants had remained with the aircraft and further search efforts terminated. Rescue report, OPNAV form 3750-13 is contained as enclosure (3).

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

VI DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The aircraft sustained ALFA damage as a result of impacting a thickly forested area in a 35° nose down, upright attitude. Explosion occured following impact with several massive trees and wreckage was strewn over an area approximately 2000' X 500' against a rising 40° slope in a conical expanding pattern. Complete examination of the wreckage was not possible due to heavy snow cover and fallen trees in the initial impact area. Prior to impact the aircraft had severed numerous trees as it approached the ground. The area upslope showed patchy areas of residual ground fire of short duration. Fragments of nose radome and port outer wing panel were located along the flight path 350 feet prior to the impact area. Fragmentation of the aircraft was severe and no components were found intact. Engines were located up slope from the impact center, the port engine broken into 2 major sections and the starboard into 3 sections. All recovered engine sections and accessory components that could give evidence of inflight operation were salvaged and shipped for DIR.

Portions of both ATM's and accessories were located close to the left side of the impact area. Scroll and nozzle guide vanes from both ATM's were found. Stators to both AC generators, a DC generator housing, a DC armature, pressurization turbine, and wing fuel pump were located in the same vicinity. An ATM turbine and an internal section of hydraulic pump were found approximately 300' upslope. These parts were submitted for DIR.

A number of cockpit instruments were recovered. The TACAN DME gauge, VGI, standby gyro, angle of attack and turn & bank were found and submitted for DIR. A portion of fiber glass curtain approximately 1½' X 2½' was recovered and found charred though its location was in an upslope area devoid of other ground fire indications. One of the two escape chute actuating cylinders, found nearly intact, was submitted for DIR.

See enclosure (4) for a general wreckage diagram. This diagram does not indicate all wreckage found but is submitted to permit a better understanding of the crash site. A great number of components of interest to the investigators were not recovered due to thick snow cover (4 to 6' in depth) and continued snow flurries which daily recovered the site.

VII THE INVESTIGATION

A. Flight Investigation

On 4 April 1967 the aircraft had flown to NAS Miramar for the dual purpose of conducting an instrument training flight for LCDR PARKS and providing transportation for LCDR KING and LCDR (b) (6) for attendance at a 0800 5 April COMCVW-12 conference. LCDR KING served as flight instructor for the flight to Miramar. The landing at Miramar was exceptionally hard as noted in LCDR (b) (6) statement (enclosure (5)). It was not in his mind severe enough to be considered a "hard landing" of sufficient magnitude to require an inspection. No repairs were conducted on the aircraft.

The following day 5 April 1967 the aircraft was scheduled for a 1300 departure from Miramar to Whidbey Island. The flight was properly constituted as an instrument training flight with LCDR PARKS as replacement pilot in the pilots seat, the instructor pilot LCDR KING occupying the bombardiers seat, ADJ3 MILLER as plane captain and LCDR READER as passenger. It is not known which seat positions LCDR READER or ADJ3 MILLER occupied.

The flight was properly filed (see enclosure (6)) and departed NAS Miramar at 1316 via direct Bakersfield, J-5 Seattle direct Whidbey Island with FL 220 assigned. In the Los Angeles Center area of control the aircraft was descended to FL 180 for reasons unknown. A study of the complete flight tape transcripts does not reveal any reason for descent to lower altitude.

Flight thru the Oakland area was uneventful till after passing the Reno 155/78 radial. At 1419 numerous calls were made by Oakland Center with no acknowledgement. From then until last contact at 1431 radio communications were intermittent. See enclosure (7) for a transcript of communications during this period. At 1431 Seattle Center observed on radar the aircraft deviate from flight track in a sharp left turn and disappear from contact at 41 - 27N, 120 - 15W.

NORAD radar maintained a plot on the aircraft till losing contact at 1431.9. A plot of their computerized track (see enclosure (2)) shows a left deviation from track commencing at 1429.4 with increased left turn aggravation occuring at 1431.5. The last reliable fix was at 1431.9. During the period of left track deviation the ground speed slowed from 463 KTS to 396 KTS. The portion of final track from 1431.5 to 1431.9 records a change of ground speed from 443 KTS to 396 KTS. Last contact from the NORAD plot occured at 41 - 20N, 120 - 13W.

The actual crash location was sighted by a witness 8½ miles from the scene (see enclosure (8)) who heard an explosion and saw smoke. His subsequent report via telephone to the county sheriff in Alturas, California was instrumental towards visual spotting of the wreckage the following day. The correct crash location was established as 41 - 17N, 120 - 16W.

B. Site Investigation

The crash occurred in a moderately forested area in approximately 4 feet of snow with higher drifts. Trees of varying trunk size from 6 inches to 2 feet in diameter were severed and or fallen both prior to ground contact and following. Others were canted at varying degrees from vertical from the impact point forward along the path of the crash. Elevation of the impact point was approximately 7200 feet with wreckage strewn over a 500' X 2000' area against a rising 40° slope to 7400'. Site photos are contained as enclosure (9).

Examination of the site and severed trees along the flight path indicates that the aircraft initially encountered the top of a tree in a nose low, slight right wing down condition heading 205° magnetic. Continued tree contact for approximately 400 feet at a 35° dive angle caused the aircraft to impact the ground in a slight left wing down condition. Explosion occurred upon contact with the trees. The identification and positioning of the wreckage confirmed that the aircraft had been in an upright attitude with some degree of left wing down condition at impact. At or near the impact point no indications of ground fire existed. However, upslope 300' to 900' slightly burned patchy areas were evident indicating residual ground fire of short duration.

Major sections of both engines were located. The port engine sections were to the left of the crash path. All sections were severely damaged with some discs and the majority of compressor and turbine blades missing. Very little engine case remained attached to the main bodies. Shafts showed little evidence of torsional failure. A number of Z bent compressor & turbine blades were found, some remaining on the engine, others located from digging efforts. No large compressor blades from the port N-1 compressor were located. Major pieces of fuel control, fuel heater and oil filter were found near the left side of the impact point. All port engine components and accessories that could be found were shipped to NAS North Island for DIR. Enclosure (10) containes photographs of engine sections.

The starboard engine was found in three sections. The compressor and burner sections were partially surrounded by engine casing while the turbine section was devoid of external cover. Again, the majority of blades were missing from the engine, however, numerous blades were recovered along the starboard side of the flight path. Shafts showed some evidence of torsional failure. No engine accessories to the starboard engine were found. All components located were sent to NAS North Island for DIR. Starboard front engine sections, speedrings or oil coolers were not located.

It could not be definitely established that the airframe was intact at the time of the impact. Portions of the upper vertical stabilizer, rudder assembly, horizontal stabilizer, port aileron counter weights and outer wing panel skin were identifiable. Wing, horizontal stabilizer, and elevator extremities were not located. The recovery of small

fragments conditionally identified as outer wing panels, elevators and ailerons tends to imply a completeness. However, evidence recovered is insufficient to state irrefutably an intact airframe.

Portions of both air turbine motors and accessories were recovered and inspected for evidence of rotation or inflight operation. Both ATM shrouds and an ATM turbine wheel were intact and some slight degree of rotation was evident on all units. See enclosure (11) for photographs of all airframe accessory components. The pressurization cooling turbine and exhaust vanes showed some indications of turning at impact. Both AC generator stators, one DC generator stator, one DC generator armature, and portions of a hydraulic pump were examined and showed little or no evidence of rotation. All components were shipped to NAS Alameda for DIR.

An AC wing fuel transfer pump was recovered and submitted for DIR. A nearly intact escape chute firing cylinder was recovered and submitted for DIR.

Pilot cockpit instruments recovered included the VGI, standby gyro horizon, TACAN (ID-310), oil temperature gauge, angle of attack, and turn and bank indicator. The VGI indicated the aircraft to be in an inverted nose high attitude. This is a like position a VGI assumes when power is lost from the instrument. The standby gyro horizon face was obliterated and nothing could be determined from this instrument. The TACAN DME (ID-310) showed a milage indication at 76 NM, however, the OFF bar was missing. The oil temperature gauge indicated 150° on the starboard engine but no reading was possible on the port since the needle was missing. The angle of attack face had an OFF flag indication implying no power to the instrument. The turn & bank instrument reading indicated a slightly less than a half standard rate right turn. All instruments were submitted for DIR.

All wreckage was closely examined for signs of inflight fire. An unidentified piece of impregnated fiberglass cloth approximately 1½' X 2½' in size bore some evidence of possible fire and overheating prior to impact. It was found in an area of no surrounding ground burn indications. All other wreckage was examined for evidence of burning or overheating inflight. The fiberglass material was submitted for DIR.

There was no indication of any survival equipment having been utilized. All parachutes were located in the crash site and remained attached to torso harness KOCH fittings. All survival equipment suffered severe crash damage. Limited evidence indicated that some seat belts and shoulder harnesses were still fastened.

Dense snow cover severely hampered the recovery of additional pertinent wreckage. Daily snow flurries frequently covered previous days efforts and restricted movement by helicopter. Access by ground means via truck, snow tractor and snowshoes was limited by the carrying capacity of the snow tractor and the excessive traveling time required. (6 hour round-trip)

C. Aircraft History

A3B BUNO 138917 was accepted by the Navy from Douglas Aircraft Co. on 28 December 1956. Subject aircraft was in the seventh (7) month of service period number seven (7) with the last progressive aircraft rework being completed at NAS Alameda on 16 September 1966. Wing damage was received during a carrier landing on 5 May 1959. Repair of the outboard wing panel, wing tip and starboard engine nacelle was effected by O & R Alameda. Due to corrosion, the aircraft was restricted from loft bombing in Oct 1962 with subsequent replacement of upper left and right hand wing skins. Grindouts in lower wing skins were within allowable tolerence and repairs were completed by NAS Alameda on 21 June 1963. On 14 Aug 1963 the aircraft received class "C" damage as a result of a port engine failure and partial engine disintegration. Numerous holes were patched in the fuselage and the upper vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly. The center wing slat, L/H main landing gear door, L/H pylon and nacelle, fuel dump and outlet assembly were replaced by an O & R Field team.

The above history is from the aircraft log book. The following history was obtained from the contractor and is included without amplification:

a. 9 Jan 1960 tail hook and shank failure.

b. 13 Feb 1960 wheels up landing due to hydraulic failure, Echo damage.

c. 4 Sep 1960 Delta damage to nose section from taxi accident.

d. Oct 1960 5" crack in keel repaired.

Both engines were installed during PAR at NAS Alameda in September 1966. Since installation, the accumulated time had been 439.7 hours. Total time since acceptance by the Navy was 2864.5 hours on the port engine, and 2076.1 hours on the starboard engine. Total time since overhaul was 439.7 hours on the port engine, and 439.7 hours on the starboard engine.

Routine maintenance was performed with no unusual incidents recorded on the engines during this operating period.

Total accumulated flight time since acceptance was 3748.9 hours. Total flight time since last PAR was 438.6 hours. Twelve (12) weeks and six (6) days had elapsed since the last "ODD" aircraft inspection was performed.

A complete review of the log book indicates all applicable directives that were required to make the aircraft operational had been performed. The following "F" code technical directives had not been completed.

AFC 303 - Wing Tank Pressurization Vent

AFC 380 - Radome Boot

AFC 382 - High Frequency Antenna

AFC 388 - Flex Waveguide

AFC 395 - Periscope Cover Switch

AFC 404 - MLG Wheel Bearing

AFB 77 - Flap Hinge Fitting

AFB 88A - Fuel Filter Installation

The following Aircraft Service Changes and Airframe Changes were not incorperated by higher level maintenance activities.

28	Receiver Probe & New Lox
228	Baird Atomic Sextant
336	MOD ARC-27 ANT Cable
363	Tail Cone Removal/Blank off inlet scoop
376	ATM Ejector Duct Assy Replacement
377	Bleed air System (Bleed Air Pylons Shutoff)
390	Flap Hinge Fittings Change
395	Periscope
405	Wing Slat Track (Reinforcement)

A review of the last ten "B" sections to the OPNAV form 3760-2 was not possible since there documents accompanied the aircraft. Therefore the Maintenance Officer's statement (enclosure (12)) contains a listing of work orders from the maintenance control register for the period 22 March to 4 April. Oil consumption rates were checked and found to be normal on both engines.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

D. DIR Investigation

The engine DIR was accomplished by the Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island. Their message report is contained in enclosure (13). As stated both engines received major impact damage.

A study of the port engine indicated low or no RPM on impact. Subsequent telephone conversation revealed that in addition to the missing number one (1) main bearing, the first three (3) stages of the N-1 compressor section were also absent. No evidence was discovered to establish an engine malfunction.

The starboard engine was rotating at impact and investigation revealed no evidence of malfunction. As with the port, the starboard engine number one (1) main bearing was missing.

Naval Air Rework Facility, NAS Alameda conducted the investigation on the ATM components, airframe accessories and cockpit instruments. Their message report is contained in enclosure (13).

The following evidence was established:

1. Both air turbine motors were turning at impact.
2. Screw failure on an AC generator indicated unit rotating on impact.
3. One DC generator bearing damage indicated stationary axial impact.
4. Pressurization turbine turning at impact.
5. Wing fuel AC boost pump running at impact.
6. Aileron and surface control hydraulic pump had no evidence of seizure.
7. Escape chute cylinder had not been fired.
8. The TACAN DME (ID-310) indicator reading at 76NM is probably reliable within plus three, minus four miles.
9. Angle-of-attack indicator face read OFF, no angle-of-attack reading possible.
10. Burned fiberglass material identified as a portion of fuel tank liner surrounding the aft or forward fuselage fuel cell. Marks and burn pattern could not be established as having occured inflight.

All other materials shipped for DIR yielded no pertinent facts unknown to the accident board.

E. Crew Factors

The crew was properly prepared for the return flight from NAS Miramar to NAS Whidbey. There is no evidence of adverse physical or psychological factors effecting crew performance.

LCDR PARKS a replacement pilot on an instrument training flight had demonstrated slightly above average ability in the A3B. Initial jet aircraft experience had been acquired in VF-126 just prior to reporting to VAH-123. In VF-126 he amassed a total of 55 hours in the TF-9J demonstrating above average ability in the jet transition phase and average proficiency in the instrument phase. He had met all requirements for flight in the A3B. Ditching and bail out drill had been completed on 10 February 1967. A resume of LCDR PARK's past five years of flight experience is contained in enclosure (14).

LCDR KING, the instructor pilot with 4200 total flight hours had compiled a total of 833 hours in the A3B. He held a current SPECIAL instrument rating and was considered qualified for flight operations in the A3B. It should be noted that LCDR KING maintained a dual aircraft qualification in the A6A. As senior squadron LSO it was necessary that this dual qualification be maintained. A resume of LCDR KING's past five years flight experience is contained in enclosure (14).

ADJ3 MILLER, was a designated A3B plane captain with over 1100 hours in the aircraft. He was considered qualified for flight operations in the A3B.

LCDR READER, a passenger, with orders to VAH-123 for A6A training was not qualified in the A3B. Information on LCDR READER's past flight experience is not available. It is assumed that he had been properly briefed on emergency escape procedures from the aircraft, however no formal ditching and bailout drills were given.

F. Weather Investigation

Enclosure (15) is an analysis of weather conditions in the area of the crash. The weather is interpolated from reporting stations nearest to the site and is considered an expert estimate of prevailing weather at 1430 5 April 1967.

Capt. (b) (6) USAF, on 5 April in a F-101 from Kingsley AFB was vectored to the scene by Seattle Center for a communications search at the time of the mishap. His statement, enclosure (16), is in basic agreement with the weather estimate.

VII THE ANALYSIS

A. Flight Analysis

The return flight to NAS Whidbey Island was planned for and originally flown at FL 220. The flight was descended to FL 180 shortly after initial level-off, probably because of conflicting traffic.

Flight progress was normal until the aircraft experienced intermittent UHF radio difficulties approximately 25 minutes prior to the crash. It should be noted that this particular area on J-5, between Lakeview and Reno, has in the past been an area of poor communications in many A-3B aircraft. Voice communications that were completed between 1406 and 1430 were normal and indicated no difficulty.

Three minutes before impact the aircraft commenced left turn deviation. The turn began at 1429.4 with the aircraft heading 352°, 463 KTS ground speed. From then until 1431.5 left turn increased to 339° and ground speed decreased to 443 GS. From 1431.5 to 1431.9, left turn rate increased drastically from 339° to 327°. Ground speed reading during this time interval dropped sharply from 443 to 396 GS. Actual altitude is not known.

The position of last reliable radar contact was three miles from the impact point.

The aircraft initially contacted numerous trees at a 35° dive angle in a slight right wing down, upright attitude. Tree contact caused the aircraft to roll to a slight left wing down condition at ground impact. Final aircraft heading was 205° magnetic.

The only witness, Mr. BROOKS, stated he could not see the top of Eagle Peak five miles distant from the crash scene. He did state that he could see the ridgeline at the crash site. Eagle Peak elevation is 9883' while the crash site is at the 7400' elevation. Somewhere between these altitudes the aircraft reached VFR conditions. Since the aircraft crashed in a nearly wings level condition it is possible that the pilot had some degree of control over the aircraft and was attempting to recover from a steep dive.

B. Material Failure/Malfunction

The following evidence supports inflight port engine failure:

(1) DIR investigation revealed little or no rotation on impact.

(2) The flight track deviated to the left.

(3) Ground speed slowed from 463 KTS to 396 KTS.

The following additional facts further substantiate port engine failure and infer catastrophic disintegration inflight. A review of past catastrophic failures in the A3B revealed several cases

where control of the aircraft was momentarily lost or marginal. IFR conditions would aggravate this problem. The first three stages and number one main bearing of the N-1 compressor section were not found in the wreckage. No large N-1 compressor blades were located as belonging to the port engine. Oil coolers, fairings or speed rings were not recovered. A secured engine would have been windmilling at a much higher rotational speed than was indicated in the DIR. DIR on recovered engine sections found no cause for engine stoppage.

The starboard engine was running at impact at low or IDLE RPM. No evidence was found contrary to the belief that it was functioning normally.

Analysis of ATM's and accessories indicate operating conditions. A variance exists between the DIR message report that the ATM's were running at impact and that a DC generator indicated only impact damage. Since the DC generator is spline shafted directly to the ATM gear train it is not likely that an ATM can be rotating without rotation on the DC generator. A sheared generator shaft or broken gear train would be the only circumstances that would allow such an event. Since generator shafts have a designed shear strength, a failure from a sheared shaft remains a possibility. In any event, the seizure or stoppage would not adversely effect the operation of the other DC generator or the battery.

A study of cockpit instruments indicates a probable number one AC generator power loss of unknown duration prior to impact.

The TACAN (ID-310) DME indicator showed a fixed range at 76NM. DIR results stated this reading possible within plus three minus four miles. When AC power is taken from the instrument the mileage indication stops and records the last mileage received. A loss of LOCK ON is manifested by continually spinning counters. Had power from the number one AC been available, the aircraft would have LOST LOCK ON when below the line of sight to Lakeview and the DME counters would have revolved to some number indication of 0 to 199. To have lost LOCK ON and revolved to a 76NM reading at impact seems remote. A measure of TACAN distance from Lakeview VORTAC to the impact point is 72 nautical miles.

The remote attitude indicator (VGI) was located and examination of the face indicated an inverted nose up wing down attitude. This is the position the VGI assumes with power removed from the aircraft. Again it appears remote that the VGI would move to this position at impact had their been AC power applied.

These individual indications are inconclusive separately but collectively provide a strong argument to support loss of number one AC generator power.

For the number two generator, a DIR of the wing fuel transfer pump established that it was running at impact. Since there is no evidence to contradict number two AC generator power availability it

where control of the aircraft was momentarily lost or marginal. IFR conditions would aggravate this problem. The first three stages and number one main bearing of the N-1 compressor section were not found in the wreckage. No large N-1 compressor blades were located as belonging to the port engine. Oil coolers, fairings or speed rings were not recovered. A secured engine would have been windmilling at a much higher rotational speed than was indicated in the DIR. DIR on recovered engine sections found no cause for engine stoppage.

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For the number two generator, a DIR of the wing fuel transfer pump established that it was running at impact. Since there is no evidence to contradict number two AC generator power availability it

must be assumed that the standby gyro horizon was functioning as well.

The above conditions can be caused by insufficient bleed air supply to the ATM's.

Examination of ATM scrolls showed both sets of nozzle guide vanes to be in a nearly closed position. This is the position the guide vanes will assume when the ATM governor attempts to maintain designed ATM speed from insufficient bleed air. Normally, at single engine 70 percent RPM on the ground under static minimum load conditions, sufficient bleed air is available to operate both ATM's with associated hydraulic pumps and generators. Application of additional loads to the hydraulic pumps such as operation of speed brakes, cycling of surface controls or electrical demands on the generators, (such as AC trim actuation), will burden the ATM's to sufficient extent to cause a loss of AC power from both under frequency and under voltage conditions. This can occur to both generators. However, normally the number one AC generator, which carries the greatest electrical load, will fail in advance of number two since more bleed air is required to maintain ATM speed. Unless an increased quantity of bleed air is supplied, the generator will operate under low RPM with continued under frequency and under voltage output. The majority of AC electrical systems are frequency sensitive and require a steady state 400 ± 20 CPS for proper operation. Both TACAN and VGI instruments are considered frequency sensitive and unreliable below an estimated 360 CPS.

A reduced bleed air supply in an aircraft operating under single engine conditions can be derived in three ways. A faulty flapper check valve, ruptured bleed air duct or single engine operation at reduced RPM will deny sufficient bleed air to operate at the ATM's governed speed.

In the event of engine failure the flapper check valves, located near the wing roots at bleed air duct coupling joints, are designed to prevent the escape of bleed air through the failed engine. Squadron aircraft are started on starboard engines on odd calendar days and port engine on even number days. This action provides a check on the operation of the valve. No past discrepancies were reported and it is assumed that valve operation was satisfactory.

That a ruptured bleed air duct could have caused a reduced air supply is a consideration. All past known catastrophic engine failures that disentegrated in flight and shed parts into the airframe caused damage to the airframe aft of the engine disintegration point. A section of bleed air ducting is aft of a lateral plane measured from the forward N-1 compressor stage. This ducting is located in the wing and on the engine side of the flapper check valve. At engine failure this line would be isolated by the closing of the flapper check valve. From the check valve inboard to the fuselage, and subsequent, all ducting common to both engines is very near to or forward of the lateral plane. Approximately 18 inches of ducting common to both engines is vulnerable to shrapnel damage. This section could have been punctured or severed by flying shrapnel. A study of

past engine failures indicates this probability remote but not impossible.

The third likely cause of bleed air reduction is reduced power to the starboard engine. Idle RPM on both engines is considered sufficient to operate ATM's at designed speed with no load. From past A3B experience, AC generators have dropped off the line under dual engine IDLE conditions when hydraulic loads or heavy electrical loads were placed on the ATM's. Single engine low power, at or near the IDLE range, is considered insufficient to sustain the ATM's in normal operation. Though bleed air is available to drive the ATM's, they will operate at reduced RPM's with the generators at under frequency, under voltage output. Following the starboard engine DIR report, a phone call to O & R North Island established that the starboard engine was operating in the IDLE range at impact.

Evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive. All wreckage recovered was examined for indications of inflight fire. One piece of fiberglass material was found and its manner of fold and burned areas suggested the possibility of having occured inflight. DIR analysis of the material determined it to be fuel cell tank liner used as external covering around the forward and aft main fuel cells. Since the material also bears indications of ground fire, though recovered in an area devoid of noticeable ground fire activity, the evidence is controversial. It should be noted that a sizable number of wreckage items became entangled in tree branches and subsequently fell to the ground in the days following the accident. Conceivably, burning could have taken place in the upper tree branches. In any event, no other indications of inflight fire were found. Without further support, evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive.

A review of the aircraft history contains no revelant information as possible contributory factors to the accident. Existing records indicate that J-57 Engine Bulletin 535 had been incorporated in the port engine. Verification from engine examination was not possible since front stages of the port N-1 compressor section were not recovered.

C. Weather Analysis

The weather at FL 180 was IFR with patchy intermittent VFR conditions. With decreasing altitude, VFR conditions became more predominant. A PIREP reported turbulence as occasionally light with no icing reported. Surface conditions in the area appear to have been broken conditions between 9880' MSL and 7500' MSL with visibility reduced in areas of snow flurries.

D. Survival Equipment Analysis

Examination of all evidence indicates there was no use of any escape systems or equipment. No personal survival equipment was utilized.

The emergency escape chute cylinder was recovered and submitted for DIR. Examination revealed only impact damage. The impulse car-

tridge was removed and test fired within voltage and current requirements. A minimum of 6 volts is required to fire the cartridge. This voltage is available on the 28V DC battery bus. This bus is active at all times regardless of any cockpit switch position. Therefore it seems certain that no attempt was made to vacate the aircraft.

E. Pilot/Personnel Factor Analysis

Strong evidence supports starboard engine operation at low RPM. This condition was most probably a result of pilot response. Nothing provides evidence to suggest the starboard engine low power to be a result of material malfunction.

Available evidence indicates no attempt to abandon the aircraft. The emergency escape door was not fired. The decision to delay bail-out was most probably based on the erroneous conclusion that the aircraft altitude of 18,000 feet permitted sufficient time to attempt recovery from an unusual attitude prior to passing 10,000 feet. Once the aircraft passed 10,000 feet in a steep dive only seconds remained prior to impact. Even if the aircraft was in VFR conditions at that time it would have been obvious to the crew that they were too low to bail out.

F. NATOPS Factors

The A-3 NATOPS Manual, Section I, page 72N, contains the following CAUTION note:

"During single engine flight do not throttle the engine to IDLE as the engine bleed air is not sufficient to operate the ATM units".

Other than the evidence that the starboard engine was operating at IDLE, there is no indication that the NATOPS Manual was not being complied with or that NATOPS requirements or procedures were a factor in the accident.

A recommendation to include further CAUTION warnings concerning the above note in the A-3B Pocket Checklist and the Emergency Section of the A-3B NATOPS Manual has been submitted in accordance with OPNAV INST 3510.9B.

VIII CONCLUSIONS

The cause of the accident is determined to be inflight port engine failure. The cause of the engine failure is undetermined. The most probable cause of engine failure is inflight disintegration of the primary N-1 compressor stages or malfunction of number one main bearing. It is felt that the failure may have been catastrophic involving explosion in flight causing some degree of control loss to the aircraft. Evidence of bleed air duct rupture was not found and therefore not considered. Evidence of inflight fire is inconclusive.

The following additional factors severely aggravated the mishap.

The weather is considered a prime factor to the accident. It is felt that the aircraft may have been initially out of control in IFR conditions. Recovery on a single engine by an inexperienced A3B pilot under IFR conditions would be extremely difficult. The instructor pilot in the right-hand seat could not fully analyze and respond with proper voice instruction rapidly enough to prevent the development of aggravated aircraft performance.

It is further suggested that the crew was occasionally VFR. Perhaps enough to suggest that better VFR weather could be encountered immediately below FL 180. This expectation of improved VFR conditions and partial regaining of control may have led to intentional continued descent to lower altitude. That such action was contemplated may account for the apparent lack of attempt to bail out.

All available evidence has shown no mechanical reason for the starboard engine to have been operating in the IDLE range. This appears to have been a pilot action either to descend voluntarily or to reduce excessive airspeed built up during an uncontrolled descent. Had the descent been completely uncontrolled, some evidence would be manifest that preparations had been made to BAILOUT. The following events would result in a power reduction on the starboard engine:

1. Port engine disintegration.
2. Aircraft yaw to left.
3. Some degree of control loss.
4. Nose down condition aggravated by loss of port engine thrust.
5. Possible expectation of VFR weather at lower altitude.
6. No awareness of actual terrain clearance.
7. Pilot response, throttle RETARD.

The action of retarding a single engine to the IDLE range will cause a loss of AC generator power to below that required to maintain

the AC cockpit instruments on the line. Initially, at electrical power loss, the number one AC generator fails. If the pilot responds to the situation by securing the number one generator in order to effect a BUS TIE, thereby transferring the electrical load to the number two AC generator, then the number two AC generator will assume all electrical load and subsequently fail in the same manner. With only limited bleed air available, the AC generators may intermittently reach operating frequency. However, this possibility is remote unless more bleed air is forced to the ATM's by engine power application.

It is considered a strong probability that loss of AC electrical power occurred during the pilot's attempts to regain positive control of the aircraft.

The board's conclusions are based on limited evidence and findings are, in part, circumstantial. All evidence supports the findings. No evidence is to the contrary. Due to the inaccessibility of the crash site and dense snow cover a great deal of wreckage was not found that could establish further proof or modify the board's conclusions. As snow cover recedes in warmer weather, additional wreckage will be exposed that may provide further information.

IX Recommendations

1. The need for an early decision to abandon the aircraft in uncontrolled flight conditions must again be reemphasized to all flight crew personnel.

2. (b)(5) [redacted]

3. The installation of the YANKEE Extraction system in A-3B aircraft should proceed on a priority basis.

4. Include additional explanation and warning concerning the single engine power setting requirements to sustain complete ATM operation in the A-3B Pocket Checklist and the Emergency Section of the A-3B NATOPS Manual. A routine change has been proposed in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3510.9B.

5. With improving weather and greater accessibility to the crash site further wreckage recovery should establish additional evidence pertinent to the investigation. It is recommended that further investigation be conducted and new evidence, as received, be disseminated to all concerned.

VAH-123 SERIAL 1-67A 5 APRIL 1967

A3B 138917 PILOT PARKS

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

ENCLOSURES

ENCL	TITLE
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2	Maps of Flight Track, Crash Location
3	Rescue Report, OPNAV 3750-13 (original only)
4	Wreckage Diagram
5	LCDR (b) (6) Statement
6	Copy of Flight Plan
7	FAA Flight Transcript
8	Mr. Floyd BROOK's Statement
9	Wreckage Site Photographs
10	Engine Photographs
11	Airframe Component Photographs
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16	Capt. (b) (6) Statement

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750

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V. INVESTIGATION(AAR)

VI. THE ANALYSIS(AAR)

VII. CONCLUSIONS(AAR)

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS(AAR)

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MEDICAL OFFICER

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE, Oak Harbor, Washington 98277	1-67	

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. TIME & ZONE	6. DATE	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	1432Z	5 April 1967	20 mi. SE of Alturas, California Near Eagle Peak.

8. MODEL A/C	9. BUNO	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	11. DAMAGE CODE	12. UNIT OPERATING A/C
A3B	138917	4	A	VAH 123

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/ RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
A PARKS, Richard E.	VAH-123	LCDR	(b) (6)	A	A	1/12/67	Yes	1	A	A
B KING, Donald E.	VAH-123	LCDR		H	H	9/27/66	Yes	1	A	A
C READER, James M.	VF-126	LCDR		R	R	8/17/66	Yes	1	A	A
D MILLER, Carl V., Jr.	VAH-123	ADJ	(b) (6)	X	X	3/1/67	Yes	1	A	A

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. MOR NO.
N.A.					

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)

See enclosure (I).

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Inflight failure of port engine

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

Weather

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [X] NO [ ]

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [X] DRAWINGS, SKETCHES, PHOTOS [X] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [X] WITNESS STATEMENTS [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer)	DATE	(Name & signature of reviewing authority)	DATE
(b) (6) LCDR MC USN	8 May 1967	(b) (6) CDR USN	12 May 1967

OF-01F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685974

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP (List in order in accordance with Section B of Inst.)

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R
Material failure(portengine)	M			
Weather	M			
Pilot inexperience	Q			
Vertigo.	Q			

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

REMARKS

This emergency was severe and would have taxed a very experienced pilot in type. Aircraft was intermittently IFR/VFR and when emergency began and progressed, obscuration may have made vertigo a possible factor.

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS (All models)	24
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS (All models)	3.8
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS (Include present flight)	2
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1+15
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	2821

FLIGHT TIME	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
THIS MODEL	25	24	25	25

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	0

12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS

None known.

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS.	15½
14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP	Forward
15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP	In pilot's seat; strapped in.

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA. (Compare with health record)



AGE 34

HEIGHT (b) (6)

WEIGHT

A. SITTING HEIGHT

B. TRUNK HEIGHT

C. FUNCTIONAL REACH

D. BUTTOCK - KNEE

E. LEG LENGTH

F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID)

16. See Pathologist's Report. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1.			TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2.			MUSCLE		
	3.			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENT						

17. X-RAY RESULTS

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	13[redacted]17	A

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

PARKS, Richard E. LCDR (b) (6)

OP-057

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—688873

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[illegible]ENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE [illegible]

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6B (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — *See OP[illegible]NST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION E — INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

[illegible]AL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO [illegible]HAP

TIME	
	Monday,3 [illegible]1 1967
1200	Lunch in [illegible]on area
1730	Home-bourbon [illegible]ter(2)
1930	Dinner(ham,baked potatoes, squash,tomato juice)
2200	In bed,watched TV
2315	Sleep
	Tuesday,4 April 1967
0615	Arose
	No breakfast
0700	Departed for squadron
1200	Departed squadron area for errands in town
1400	Hamburger at home
1500	Departed for squadron
1800	Sandwich in ready room
1950	Manned aircraft (A3B BuNo 138917)
2021	Departed NAS Whidbey Island for NAS Miramar
2255	Deplaned at NAS Miramar
2330	At BOQ,watched late show on TV
	Wednesday,5 April 1967
0130	Retired after show
0830(est)	Arose (Wife guesstimated that he had breakfast consisting of 2 eggs,toast and black coffee)
1230	Briefed for return to NAS Whidbey
1316	Departed NAS Miramar for NAS Whidbey Island,box luches in aircraft
1428	Oakland Center granted permisssion to contact Seattle Center
1430	Reported to Seattle Center but when requested to squawk IDENT,did not reply.
1431	Seattle Center radar noted left turn and lost contact.

TIME	
ACCIDENT PHASE	
1432	Crashed near Eagle Peak, 20 miles SE of Alturas, California
ESCAPE PHASE	
SURVIVAL PHASE	

TIME OF RESCUE

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	A

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

PARKS, Richard E. LCDR (b) (6)

OP-01F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685975

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE
OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAV 3750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA (Refer to Section F of instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A/A

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: None

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [X] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED [ ] 5. ASPHYXIATED [ ] 6. SHOCK [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: None

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: N.A.

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: N.A.

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [XX] NO [ ] YES

12. DURATION (See instruction)

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME #8690

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [XX] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [XX] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [X] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, theorize)
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME	X				Cockpit disintegrated as aircraft crashed through trees.

20. REMARKS

See Pathologist's Report and NAVMED N which are attached.

MDR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	A

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: PARKS, Richard E. LCDR (b) (6)

GP-057 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685972

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
NAVMED N-(REV. 4-58) FRONT

See RANKED DEPT. for instructions regarding number of copies and submission.

FROM (Ship or Station)
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

IF UNIDENTIFIED INDICATE BY USING "X" AND CONSECUTIVE NUMBER HERE

1. NAME
PARKS, Richard Earl

2. SEX
[X] MALE [ ] FEMALE

3. RACE
[X] CAUCASIAN [ ] NEGRO [ ] OTHER (Specify)

4. STATUS
[X] REGULAR ACTIVE [ ] RESERVE ACTIVE [ ] RETIRED [ ] DEPENDENT [ ] VAP [ ] OTHER (Specify)

5. LENGTH OF SERVICE (Years and months)
12 10

6. AVIATION
[X] YES [ ] NO

7. FILE OR SERVICE NO.
[redacted]

8. RANK/RATE
LCDR

9. CORPS

10. BRANCH OF SERVICE
USN

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country)
Roscoe, Pennsylvania

12. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day and year)
(b) (6)

13. AGE (Years, months) (Days, if under 1 year)
34 4

14. RELIGION
P

15. COLOR OF EYES
Brown

16. COLOR OF HAIR
Brown

17. COMPLEXION
Ruddy

18. HEIGHT
(b) (6)

19. WEIGHT

20. MARKS AND SCARS (Noted in health record)
(b) (6)

21. FINGERPRINT - STATE WHICH FINGER (Right index preferred)
Not Available

22. NEXT OF KIN OR FRIEND (Relation, name and address)
Wife: Wanda Jo Parks, (b) (6)

23. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST FROM (If on active duty, last duty station before current admission to sick list)
HANGAR - ONE TWO THREE, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

24. DATE ADMITTED TO SICK LIST (Month, day, year)

25. PLACE OF DEATH
Near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California

26. TIME OF DEATH (Month, day, year, hour)
April 5, 1967 1432

27. CAUSE OF DEATH

I. DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH. (This does not mean the mode of dying, e.g. heart failure, asthenia, etc. It means the disease, injury or complication which caused death.)
(a) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme
APPROXIMATE INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH: Immediate

ANTECEDENT CAUSES. (Morbid conditions, if any giving rise to above cause (a), stating the underlying cause last)
DUE TO (b)

DUE TO (c)

II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS. (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the disease or condition causing death.)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

NAVMED K (Rev. 4-56) BACK

1. NAME

PARKS, Richard Earl (b) (6)

2. SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATING TO DEATH

LCDR Parks was pilot in command in U. S. Navy jet aircraft A3B, Bureau No. 138917, enroute from NAS, Miramar, California, to NAS, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington. The aircraft crashed in Warner Mountain Range near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California. Total destruction of the aircraft occured as it crashed through large (18"-48" diameter) trees into the hillside at 7400 feet elevation. Heavy snows prohibited thorough excavation of crash site.

Deceased was grossly identified by aircraft manifest and location of remains in proximity to cockpit instruments on pilot's side. Gross description of (b) (6) remains to follow from Dr. George R. Nicholson, Pathologist, Presbyterian Inter-community Hospital, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and will be appended as enclosure to VAH-123 NGR 1-67.

(b) (6) Contract mortician, O'Nair's Memorial Chapel, Klamath Falls, Oregon, has remains for preparation and disposition in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

3. DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

Shogle and Wolf Funeral Home, Weirton, West Virginia, in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

4.

DATE SIGNED 19 April 1967 SIGNATURE (b) (6) (Medical Officer) LCDR (MC) USN (Rank)

APPROVED: COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION

DATE SIGNED 19 APR 1967 SIGNATURE (b) (6) (Convening Officer) CDR USN (Rank)

G. R. NICHOLSON, M. D.
PHYSICIAN - PATHOLOGIST
2865 Daggett Street
KLAMATH FALLS, OREGON
97601

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
Pathologist's Report

IDENTIFICATION

Casualities:

NAME	AGE	RANK	SERIAL NUMBER	STATUS
KING, Donald E.	35	LCDR	(b) (6)	Instruction Pilot
READER, James M.	32	LCDR		Observor
PARKS, Richard E.	36	LCDR		Pilot in Command
MILLER,Jr., Carl V.	23	ADJ3		Plane Captain

INFORMATION RELATIVE TO ACCIDENT

AIRCRAFT: Navy Jet A3B No. 138917

ESTIMATED ALTITUDE BEFORE EMERGENCY: 18,000 feet MSL.

ALTITUDE AT CRASH SITE: 7,400 feet MSL.

WEATHER CONDITIONS: Snow showers; ceilings 5,000 ft.; visability ½ mile.

RADIO AND RADAR CONTACT: Radio at 1430 hours with Oakland Center; Radar contact by Oakland and Seattle Centers and NORAD.

PILOT CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: Parks believed to be in the left seat and at controls.

NATURE OF ACCIDENT: Pending--apparent control loss at 18,000 feet MSL.

TIME OF ACCIDENT: 5 April 1967 at 1432 hours.

SPEED AND ANGLE OF IMPACT: 550 Knots at flight angle of approximately 30 degrees from horizontal.

SEVERITY OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: Total destruction.

STATED CAUSE OF ACCIDENT: Pending.

INFORMATION RELATIVE TO ESCAPE

All four parachutes and parts of harnesses were apparently found at scene of crash. Fragments of seat belts torn and fragmented were found and one seat belt fragment was found still attached to the base of a fragment of seat. It

is not known to this examiner whether escape was attempted in the air. The type of escape apparatus in the aircraft is not known to this examiner.

EXAMINATION OF TISSUES

Having been notified by Lt. Commander (b) (6) that examination of tissues was requested, all available tissue retrieved from the crash site was assembled and examined on April 12, 1967 at Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital by myself and (b) (6) . All tissue was weighed and the total found to be 57.5 lbs. All health records of the occupants were reviewed in an attempt to find any significant anatomic variation that might help in identification. Major blood types and body weights obtained from the records were as follows:

KING, Donald E.
MILLER, Carl V.
PARKS, Richard E.
REEDER, James M.

(b) (6)

The only other significant information gleaned from the records were the facts that Carl Miller had blonde hair and Donald King had sustained a (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Documentary evidence recovered at the crash site and shown to me included: 1. Part of the dental record and immunization card of Reeder, James M., 2. Insurance identification card of Miller, Carl with agent's name John T. Brown, Oak Harbor State Farm Insurance Company readable and 3. Liberty card Number (b) dated 27 August 1964 of Miller, Carl V.

The tissue submitted consisted predominantly of bone, skeletal muscle, skin and tendinous tissue. There were (b) (6) presumably from different persons. Fingerprints had been previously obtained from both specimens by (b) (6) Other recognizable specimens included the following:

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

EXAMINATION OF TISSUES (Cont.)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Multiple segments of skeletal muscle and skin were obtained to be utilized for blood typing and possible alcohol analysis and possible carbon monoxide analysis should this be indicated. Microscopic examination of tissue (as attached) did not reveal pre-existent disease and no apparent inflammatory process occurs in the lung segments.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

It is felt that the most significant evidence not examined here of the presence of four persons is the finding of four separate parachutes and harnesses at the crash site. This fact, plus the fact that four persons are apparently signed into the aircraft at the point of origin of the flight must suffice as evidence of four persons being present at the crash site. Should additional information or material become available to me, I will forward appropriate reports or material as they are received.

George R. Nicholson M.D.

MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION

Microscopic examination included the following:

(b) (6)

[redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PA[illegible]

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA — *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A/A

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: 3/63-Fracture,distalhead,left 5th metacarpal
8/65-Fracture,medial malleolus,right ankle

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [X] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED [ ] 5. ASPHYXIATED [ ] 6. SHOCK [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE 7. EXPOSURE [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: None

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: N.A.

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: N.A.

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON [X] NO [ ] YES

12. DURATION *(See instruction)*

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME #8690

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [X] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [X] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [X] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTRME	X				Cockpit disintegrated as aircraft crashed through trees.

20. REMARKS

See Pathologist's Report and NAVMED N which are attached.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	H

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: KING, Donald E, LCDR (b) (6)

OF-65F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—698-434

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
NAVMED R (REV. 4-58) FRONT

See NAVMED DEPT. for instructions regarding number of copies and submission.

1. (Place of death)
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

If unidentified indicate by using "X" and consecutive numbers here:

2. NAME
KING, Donald Edwin

3. SEX: [X] MALE [ ] FEMALE

4. RACE: [X] CAUCASIAN [ ] NEGROID [ ] OTHER (Specify)

5. STATUS: [X] ACTIVE [ ] RESERVE ACTIVE [ ] RETIRED [ ] DEPENDENT [ ] CIVILIAN [ ] OTHER (Specify)

6. LENGTH OF SERVICE (Years and months): 15 00

7. AVIATION: [X] YES [ ] NO

8. BRANCH OF SERVICE: USN

9. RANK/RATE: LCDR

10. CORPS:

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country): Salt Lake City, Utah

12. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day and year): (b) (6)

13. AGE (Years, months) (Days, if under 1 year): 35 7

14. RELIGION: P

15. COLOR OF EYES: Brown

16. COLOR OF HAIR: Brown

17. COMPLEXION: Ruddy

18. HEIGHT: 71"

19. WEIGHT: (b) (6)

20. MARKS, SCARS (Noted on health record): (b) (6)

21. FINGERPRINT - STATE WHICH FINGER (Right index preferred): Not Available

22. NEXT OF KIN OR FRIEND (Relation, name and address)
Wife: Donna Gene King, (b) (6)

23. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST FROM (If on active duty, last duty station before current admission to sick list)
HATRON - ONE TWO THREE, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

24. DATE ADMITTED TO SICK LIST (Month, day, year)

25. PLACE OF DEATH
Near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California

26. TIME OF DEATH (Month, day, year, hour)
April 5, 1967 1432

27. CAUSE OF DEATH

I. DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH. (This does not mean the mode of dying, e.g. heart failure, asthenia, etc. It means the disease, injury or complication which caused death.)
(a) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme — APPROXIMATE INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH: Immediate
DUE TO (b):

ANTECEDENT CAUSES. (Morbid conditions, if any giving rise to above cause (a), stating the underlying cause last)
DUE TO (c):

II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS. (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the disease or condition causing death.)

28.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

NAVMED 6 (Rev. 4-58) BACK

KING, Donald Edwin (b) (6)

SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATING TO DEATH:

King was traveling as instructor pilot in U. S. Navy jet aircraft A3B, Bureau No. 138917, enroute from NAS, Miramar, California, to NAS, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington. The aircraft crashed in Warner Mountain Range near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California. Total destruction of the aircraft occurred as it crashed through large (18"-48" diameter) trees into the hillside at 7400 feet elevation. Heavy snows prohibited thorough excavation of crash site.

Deceased was grossly identified by aircraft manifest, (b) (6) (b) (6) and a wedding ring with inscription. Gross discription of (b) (6) remains to follow from Dr. George R. Nicholson, Pathologist, Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and will be appended as enclosure to VAH-123 MOR 1-67.

(b) (6) Contract mortician, O'Hair's Memorial Chapel, Klamath Falls, Oregon, has remains for preparation and disposition in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

DISPOSITION OF REMAINS:

Finley's Family Funeral Home, Portland, Oregon, in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

(b) (6)

DATE SIGNED 19 April 1967 SIGNATURE _____ LCDR (MC) USN
(Medical Officer) (Rank)

APPROVED: COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION _____

(b) (6)

DATE SIGNED 19 APR 1967 SIGNATURE _____ CDR USN
(Commanding Officer) (Rank)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART I

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions. OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA (Refer to Section F of instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A/A

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: None

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [XX] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED: [ ]

5. ASPHYXIATED: [ ]

6. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: None

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: N.A.

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: N.A.

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [XX] NO [ ] YES

12. DURATION (See instruction)

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME # 8690

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [XX] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [XX] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [XX] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, theorize)
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTRME	X				Cockpit disintegrated as aircraft crashed through trees.

20. REMARKS: See Pathologist's Report and NAVMED N which are attached.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	R

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: READER, James M. LCDR (b) (6)

JSI

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—696-434

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
NAVMED ... (REV. 4-58) FRONT

See NAVMED DIPT. for instructions regarding number of copies and submission

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

..., James Merritt

Sex: [X] Male [ ] Female
Race: [X] Caucasian [ ] Negroid [ ] Other (Specify)

Status: [X] Regular [ ] Reserve Active [ ] Retired [ ] Dependent [ ] ... [ ] Other (Specify)

Length of service (Years and months): 12 3
Aviation: [X] Yes [ ] No

File or service number: [redacted]
Rank/Rate: LCDR
Branch of service: USN
Place of birth (City and State or Country): Antigo, Wisconsin

Date of birth (Month, day and year): [redacted]
Age (Years, months): 32 9
Religion: C

Color of eyes: Blue
Color of hair: Brown
Complexion:
Height: 71"
Weight: [redacted]

Marks and scars (Noted in Health Record):
[redacted]

Fingerprint - State which finger (Right index preferred): Not Available

Next of kin or friend (Relation, name and address):
Wife: Barbara Mary Reader, [redacted]

Admitted to sick list from (If on active duty, last duty station before current admission to sick list):
...RON - 126, U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, MIRAMAR, CALIFORNIA

Date admitted to sick list (Month, day, year):

Place of death: Near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California

Time of death (Month, day, year, hour): April 5, 1967 1432

Cause of death

I. Disease or condition directly leading to death. (This does not mean the mode of dying, e.g. heart failure, asthenia, etc. It means the disease, injury or complication which caused death.)
(a) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme

Approximate interval between onset and death: Immediate

Antecedent causes (Morbid conditions, if any, giving rise to above cause (a), stating the underlying cause last)
Due to (b)
Due to (c)

II. Other significant conditions (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the disease or condition causing death.)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

NAVAER R (Rev. 4-56) BACK

[redacted], James Merritt (b) (6)

[redacted] was traveling as observer in U. S. Navy jet aircraft A3B, Bureau No. 138917, enroute from NAS, Miramar, California, to NAS, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington. The aircraft crashed in Warner Mountain Range near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California. Total destruction of the aircraft occurred as it crashed through large (18"-48" diameter) trees into the hillside at 7400 feet elevation. Heavy snows prohibited thorough excavation of crash site.

[redacted] was grossly identified by aircraft manifest and the fact that portions of his pay and dental records were found among the wreckage. Gross description of (b) (6) remains to follow from Dr. George R. Nicholson, Pathologist, Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and will be appended as enclosure to VAH-123 MOR 1-67.

(b) (6) Contract mortician, O'Hair's Memorial Chapel, Klamath Falls, Oregon, has remains for preparation and disposition in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

Taylor Funeral Home, West Grand Avenue, Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

DATE SIGNED 19 April 1967 SIGNATURE (b) (6) (Medical Officer) LCDR (MC) USN (Rank)

APPROVED COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION

DATE SIGNED 19 APR 1967 SIGNATURE (b) (6) (Commanding Officer) CDR USN (Rank)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART II

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION F — PATHOLOGICAL DATA *(Refer to Section F of instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A/A

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: None

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [XX] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED [ ] 5. ASPHYXIATED [ ] 6. SHOCK [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE 7. EXPOSURE [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE 8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: None

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: N.A.

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: N.A.

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [XX] NO [ ] YES

12. DURATION *(See instruction.)*

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME 98690

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [XX] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [XX] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [XX] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME	XX				Cockpit disintegrated as aircraft crashed through trees.

20. REMARKS:

See Pathologist's Report and NAVMED N which are attached.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	X

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: MILLER, Carl W., Jr. ADJ3 (b) (6)

GP-057

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—696-434

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
(REV. 4-58) FRONT

See NAVMED DEPT. for instructions regarding number of copies and submission

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

, Carl Vir

2. SEX: [X] MALE [ ] FEMALE

3. RACE: [X] CAUCASIAN [ ] NEGROID [ ] OTHER (Specify)

LENGTH OF SERVICE (Years and months): 5 8

[X] YES [ ] NO

[redacted]

[redacted]

BRANCH OF SERVICE: USN

PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country): Mishawaka, Indiana

AGE (Years, months) (Days, if under 1 year): 23 10

RELIGION: P

Blonde

COMPLEXION: Fair

HEIGHT: 72"

WEIGHT: [redacted]

[redacted]

FINGERPRINT: Not Available

Wife: Janet Lenore Miller, [redacted]

BATRON - ONE TWO-THREE, WHIDBEY ISLAND, WASHINGTON

DATE ADMITTED TO SICK LIST (Month, day, year)

PLACE OF DEATH: Near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California

TIME OF DEATH (Month, day, year, hour): April 5, 1967 1432

DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH. (This does not mean the mode of dying, e.g. heart failure, asthenia, etc. It means the disease, injury or complication which caused death.)

(a) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme

APPROXIMATE INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH: Immediate

ANTECEDENT CAUSES. (Morbid conditions, if any giving rise to above cause (a), stating the underlying cause last)

DUE TO (b)

DUE TO (c)

OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS. (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the disease or condition causing death.)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

NAVMED F (Rev. 4-56) BACK

MILLER, Carl Virgil, Jr. [redacted]

SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATING TO DEATH

Miller was traveling as aircrewman in U. S. Navy jet aircraft A3B, Bureau No. 138917, enroute from NAS, Miramar, California, to NAS, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington. The aircraft crashed in Warner Mountain Range near Eagle Peak, 20 miles Southeast of Alturas, California. Total destruction of the aircraft occurred as it crashed through large (18"-48" diameter) trees into the hillside at 7400 feet elevation. Heavy snows prohibited thorough excavation of crash site.

Deceased was grossly identified by aircraft manifest and the fact that he was the only blonde in the group. His liberty card and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Card were found among the wreckage. Gross description of [redacted] remains to follow from Dr. George R. Nicholson, Pathologist, Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and will be appended as enclosure to VAH-123 MOR 1-67.

[redacted] contract mortician, O'Hair's Memorial Chapel, Klamath Falls, Oregon, has remains for preparation and disposition in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

Bubb Funeral Home, 202 Main Street, Mishawaka, Indiana, in accordance with the wishes of the Next Of Kin.

DATE SIGNED 19 April 1967 SIGNATURE [redacted] (Medical Officer) LCDR (Rank) (MC) USN

APPROVED. COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION [redacted] BE HELD.

DATE SIGNED 19 APR 1967 SIGNATURE [redacted] (Commanding Officer) CDR (Rank) USN

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[illegible]CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC[illegible]NT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8F (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION; PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP S-SURVIVAL E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. [illegible]FICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
HELMET, PILOT'S PROTE[illegible]E APH-6		Y	A	A	A		SEE SECTION "H" BELOW
OXYGEN MASK	[illegible]3A	Y	A	A	A		
SIERRA RETENTION FITT[illegible]NGS		Y	A	A	A		
COVERALLS, SUMME[illegible]IC[illegible], KHAKI		Y	A	A	A		
GLOVES, WINTER, [illegible] BLACK		Y	A	A	A		
VEST, SURVIVAL, SQU[illegible] MADE		Y	A	A			
knife, survival							
knife, MC-1, shroud [illegible]ter							
SEEK kit, soft pak, [illegible] II							
flare gun, Penguin							
light, fresnel lens, matrix							
TORSO HARNESS, INTEGRATED	MA-2	Y	A	A	A		
BOOTS, IRON AGE		Y	A	A	A		
LIFE JACKET	MK-3C	Y	A	A			
PARACHUTE	NB-7D	Y	A	A			
LIFE RAFT	PK2A	Y	A				
UNDERWEAR, THERMAL			A	A	A		

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ADDENDUM TO SECTION "H", PAGE FIVE.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	"A"

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

PARKS, Richard E. LCDR USN (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965—[illegible]

ADDENDUM TO SECTION "H" ON PAGE FIVE(5) OF INDIVIDUAL "A"'S OF MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT ON AAR 1-67A OF HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE, OAK HARBOR,WASHINGTON

It should be noted that the items listed under each individual's section "G" are those which were presumed to be on his person at the time of the accident. Recollections of squadron contemporaries, para-loft checkout cards and this ssquadron's usual adherence to NATOPS requirements provide the basis for the reported data. Bits and pieces of survival gear,boots, gloves, flight suits, torso harnesses and lap belts were found. One lap belt was found in the locked position but pulled away from the seat at the retaining bolts on either side. Finding the AN/PRC-17A radio, which was known to be in the fourth seat survival gear, four parachutes and harnesses and inertial reels and two escape chute door actuating cylinders with an unfired cartridge in one (see enclosure III.I.), comprised the basis for concluding that no egress had been attempted.

That no egress was attempted seems peculiar. Several elements require discussion. As noted in enclosure (II.B), the weather was intermittently IFR/VFR. At the time the aircraft began to deviate from its flight path, regardless of the reason for the mechanical failure, the pilot may have sought a lower altitude voluntarily. Of course, the aircraft was probably uncontrollable. The sudden onset of erratic, high "G" maneuvers coupled with very unusual aircraft attitudes undoubtedly interfered with the effectiveness of any attempts at egress. Presuming that just prior to impact the aircraft was coming under some degree of control, the crewmembers may have considered themselves high enough above the terrain to effect a recovery without having to bailout.

The snow showers were probably at a lower level than expected. (During the week immediately following the accident the snow showers were periodically down to the 4-5,000 foot levels.) When the pilot realized the gravity of the situation;i.e.,approaching trees,it was too late.

Lastly,egress from this type aircraft is sorely compromised by the addition of the fourth person. Ditch and bailout drills have been held with the aircraft on the ramp. With three persons the aircraft can be emptied in less than one minute. The addition of the fourth crewmember doubles the time required for all to exit. If this observation is true under controlled circumstances, it must be of even greater significance in actual in-flight emergencies. Since the total time between the onset of the emergency(as noted by the radar operator on his screen) and the occurrence of the accident was estimated to be less than two(2) minutes, the plausibility of the foregoing premise is credible.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF [illegible] ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCI[illegible]T — PAGE 5

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8F (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH [illegible]ION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP S-SURVIVAL E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC & MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
HELMET, PILOT'S PROTECTIVE	APH-6	Y	A	A	A		SEE SECTION "H" BELOW
OXYGEN MASK	A-13A	Y	A	A	A		
SIERRA RETENTION FITTINGS		Y	A	A	A		
COVERALLS, SUMMER, FLIGHT KHAKI		Y	A	A	A		
VEST, SURVIVAL, SQUADRON MADE		Y	A	A			
knife, survival	5"						
knife, MC-1, shroud cutter							
SEEK kit, soft pak, I & II							
flare gun, Penguin							
light, fresnel lens, matrix							
TORSO HARNESS, INTEGRATED	MA-2	Y	A	A	A		
BOOTS, IRON AGE		Y	A	A	A		
LIFE JACKET	MK-3C	Y	A	A			
PARACHUTE	NB-7D	Y	A	A			
LIFE RAFT	PK2A	Y	A				
UNDERWEAR, THERMAL			A	A	A		

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ADDENDUM TO SECTION "H" OF INDIVIDUAL A's PAGE FIVE.

NOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	"H"

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

KING, Donald E. LCDR USN (b)(6)

OP-01F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—685829

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8F (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6K for instructions*

SECTION G — ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION:

PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP S-SURVIVAL E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. REQUIRED	4. AVAILABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
HELMET, PILOT'S PROTECTIVE	APH-6	Y	A	A	A		SEE SECTION "H" BELOW
OXYGEN MASK	A-13A	Y	A	A	A		
SIERRA RETENTION FITTINGS		Y	A	A	A		
COVERALLS, SUMMER, FLIGHT, ORANGE		Y	A	A	A		
GLOVES, SUMMER, FLIGHT		Y	A	A	A		
VEST, SURVIVAL, SQUADRON MADE		Y	A	A			
knife, survival	5"						
knife, MC-1, shroud cutter							
SEEK kit, soft pak, I & II							
flare gun, Penguin							
light, fresnel lens, matrix							
compass							
TORSO HARNESS, INTEGRATED	MA-2	Y	A	A	A		
BOOTS, IRON AGE		Y	A	A	A		
LIFE JACKET	MK-3C	Y	A	A			
PARACHUTE	NB-7D	Y	A	A			
LIFE RAFT	PK-2A	Y	A				

SECTION H — NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ADDENDUM TO SECTION "H" OF INDIVIDUAL A's PAGE FIVE.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	"R"

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: READER, James M., LCDR USNR (b) (6)

OP-01

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—666520

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[illegible]CCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC[illegible]NT — PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

[X] WATER [X] LAND [ ] OTHER Aircraft crashed through trees, impacted with ground and exploded. No fire.

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

[ ] EJECTION [ ] BAILOUT [ ] UNDERWATER [ ] NORMAL [ ] OTHER *(State type)*

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	Apparently did not realize actual terrain altitude.
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	

YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
X		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	Aircraft presumed in near uncontrollable condition.
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: N.A.

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: [ ] PRIMARY [ ] SECONDARY [ ] OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION:

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN [ ] FORWARD [ ] AFT [ ] OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT IMPACT: 35° div e, slight left wing down

15. AIRSPEED: 396 KTS (est)

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET) ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 7400 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY:

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: N.A.

18. WEIGHT: 203

19. TIME IN WATER: N.A.

20. TIME IN RAFT: N.A.

21. WIND VELOCITY: 13-15 Kts.

22. WAVE HEIGHT: N.A.

23. WAVE INTERVAL: N.A.

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 15-30° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: N.A.

26. VISIBILITY: Snow showers, ½ miles

27. ALERTING FACTORS

Seattle Center radar lost contact @ 1431
NORAD radar lost contact @ 1431.9
Farmer heard explosion, saw smoke, notified sheriff.

30. N.A.

31. Snow 4-5feet deep

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

Air search-light civil a/c(sheriff)
Air search-military a/c(HU-16, F-101, C-130)
Ground search-snow cat and sheriff's party

32. N.A.

33. N.A.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

Navy flight surgeon from NAS Fallon, sheriff's party and forest rangers confirmed no survivors.

34. N.A.

35. N.A

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? *(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)*

[XX] NO [ ] YES

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC	EJECTION TOWER	EJECTION SEAT	SURVIVAL
7 MAR 66	7 MAR 66	7 MAR 66	

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)*

[ ] NO [X] YES An indicated in enclosure (X) and as experienced two days after this accident by a sister squadron flying the same type aircraft, the loss of an engine particularly if combined with an explosion, can create a catastrophic situation. Weather, pilot recognition of the severity of his predicament and reaction time, aircraft maneuvers which could easily produce panic or at least vertigo--are all factors which would diminish the possibility of salvaging a recovery. VFR conditions and sufficient altitude have allowed others to extricate themselves from this potentially fatal situation. Whether or not any pilot could have effected a recovery in the present set of circumstances is conjectural.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	A

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: PARKS, Richard E. LCDR (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—695-431

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT – PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-64)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE: ☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER — Aircraft crashed through trees, impacted with ground and exploded. No fire.

2. TYPE OF EGRESS: ☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (*State type*)

E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED — Apparently did not realize actual terrain altitude.
		4. ATTEMPTED
		5. ACCOMPLISHED
		6. THRU CANOPY

YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
X		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	Aircraft presumed in near uncontrollable condition.
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: N.A.

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION:

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EJECTION: IMPACT — 35° dive, slight left wing down

15. AIRSPEED: 396 KTS (est)

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EJECTION: IMPACT — ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 7400 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY:

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: N.A.

18. WEIGHT: 173

19. TIME IN WATER: N.A.

20. TIME IN RAFT: N.A.

21. WIND VELOCITY: 13-15 KTS

22. WAVE HEIGHT: N.A.

23. WAVE INTERVAL: N.A.

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 15-30° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: N.A.

26. VISIBILITY: Snow showers ½ mile

27. ALERTING FACTORS:
Seattle Center radat lost contact @ 1431
NORAD radar lost contact @ 1431.9
Farmer heard explosion, saw smoke, notified sheriff.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE:
Air search-light sivil a/c(sheriff)
Air search-;military a/c(HU-16, F-101, C-130)
Ground search-sno cat and sheriff's party

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR:
Navy flight surgeon from NAS Fallon, sheriff's party and forest rangers confirmed no survivors.

30. N.A.

31. Snow 4-5 feet deep

32. N.A.

33. N.A.

34. N.A.

35. N.A.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (*If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue*)
☒ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC	EJECTION TOWER	EJECTION SEAT	SURVIVAL
12 SEPT 64	22 DEC 66	22 DEC 66	

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (*If yes, explain*)
☐ NO ☒ YES — See remarks under individual "A". This pilot was instructor with considerable flight time, experience as LSO and previous tours with aircraft. Since he was flying in the B/N seat, he could not have done more that tell the pilot in command what to do. In the short interval that information may not have been forthcoming since there is a question that all radios were lost about the time of the accident.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	H

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: KING, Donald E. LCDR (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—698-431

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIR ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I — DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES. REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE: ☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER — Aircraft crashed through trees, impacted with ground and exploded. No fire.

2. TYPE OF EGRESS: ☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (*State type*)

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	Apparently did not realize actual terrain altitude.
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	

YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
X		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	Aircraft presumed in near uncontrollable condition.
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: N.A.

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION:

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT IMPACT: 35° dive, slight left wing down

15. AIRSPEED: 396 KTS(est)

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT: IMPACT — ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 7400 — ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY:

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: N.A.

18. WEIGHT: 193

19. TIME IN WATER: N.A.

20. TIME IN RAFT: N.A.

21. WIND VELOCITY: 13-15 KTS

22. WAVE HEIGHT: N.A.

23. WAVE INTERVAL: N.A.

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 15-30° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: N.A.

26. VISIBILITY: Snow showers ½mile

27. ALERTING FACTORS:
Seattle center radar lost contact @ 1431
NORAD radar lost contact @ 1431.9
Farmer heard explosion, saw smoke, notified sheriff.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE:
Air search-light civil a/c(sheriff)
Air search-military a/c(HU-16,F-101,C-130)
Ground search-sno cat and sheriff's party

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR:
Navy flight surgeon from NAS Fallon, sheriff's party and forest rangers confirmed no survivors.

30. N.A.

31. [illegible]. Snow 4-5 feet deep

32. N.A.

33. N.A.

34. N.A.

35. N.A.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (*If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue*)

☒ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J — TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC: 23 MAR 67 — EJECTION TOWER: 9 DEC 63 — EJECTION SEAT: 23 MAR 67 — SURVIVAL:

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP (*If yes, explain*)

☐ NO ☒ YES See remarks under individual "A". This pilot was on leave to come to Oak Harbor to see his wife. He had apparently not had a formal ditch and bailout drill but was most likely briefed by the pilot in command. He is presumed to have ridden in the seat behind the pilot since the plane captain has to move about prior to takeoff and assist with checklist items. He is not considered as having contributed to the lack of attempt for bailout.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	R

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: READER, James M. LCDR (b) (6)

OP-03F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—698-431

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A[illegible]ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACC[illegible]NT — PAGE 6 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE: ☐ WATER ☒ LAND ☐ OTHER — Aircraft crashed through trees, impacted with ground and exploded. No fire.

2. TYPE OF EGRESS: ☐ EJECTION ☐ BAILOUT ☐ UNDERWATER ☐ NORMAL ☐ OTHER (*State type*)

S	E		REMARKS
	X	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	Apparently did not realize actual terrain altitude.
		4. ATTEMPTED	
		5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	

YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
X		7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	Aircraft presumed in near uncontrollable condition.
		8. DURING EGRESS	
		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: N.A.

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: ☐ PRIMARY ☐ SECONDARY ☐ OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION:

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: ☐ UP ☐ DOWN ☐ FORWARD ☐ AFT ☐ OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT IMPACT: 35° dive, slight left wing down

15. AIRSPEED: 396 KTS (est)

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT: IMPACT — ABOVE SEA LEVEL 7400 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: N.A.

18. WEIGHT: 180

19. TIME IN WATER: N.A.

20. TIME IN RAFT: N.A.

21. WIND VELOCITY: 13-15 KTS

22. WAVE HEIGHT: N.A.

23. WAVE INTERVAL: N.A.

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 15-30° F

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: N.A.

26. VISIBILITY: Snow showers ½ mile

27. ALERTING FACTORS: Seattle Center radar lost contact @ 1431
NORAD radar lost contact @ 1431.9
Farmer heard explosion, saw smoke, notified sheriff.

30. N.A.

31. Snow 4-5 feet deep

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: Air search-light civil aircraft(sheriff)
Air search-military a/c(HU-16, F-101, C-130)
Ground search-snow cat and sheriff's party

32. N.A.

33. N.A.

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: Navy flight surgeon from NAS Fallon, sheriff's party and forest rangers confirmed no survivors.

34. N.A.

35. N.A.

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? (*If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue*)

☒ NO ☐ YES

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING: LPC 17 FEB 66 EJECTION TOWER None EJECTION SEAT None SURVIVAL

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (*If yes, explain*)

☐ NO ☒ YES See remarks under individual "A". No training factors are considered applicable to this aircrewman for the squadron holds periodic ditch and bailout drills for all plane captains.

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-67	A3B	138917	X

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: MILLER, Catt V., Jr. ADJ3 (b) (6)

OP-05F

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—698-431

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEDICAL OFFICER ON AAR 1-67A, HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO THREE, OAK HARBOR, WASHINGTON

A. CONCLUSIONS

1. It is concluded that the sudden material failure of the port engine produced such an instantaneously unusual attitude that the aircraft and its occupants were in extremis without any forewarning. Foul weather in the form of snow showers and terrain in the form of a mountain range contributed to the final fatal outcome. All evidence thus far is based on limited retrieval of aircraft parts and human remains due to snow cover at the accident site.

2. That there were no survivors to this accident may be due to one or more of the following factors: the rapidity of onset, the severity of aircraft maneuvers with high "G" forces involved, the pilot's hope of finding VFR conditions at a lower altitude but above the terrain, the regaining of some control over the aircraft, the short time span between onset of emergency and impact with the ground, the presence of the fourth crewmember and the lack of an ejection device.

3. (b) (5)

[redacted]

4. Psychological and physiological factors were considered; first, as a cause of the accident; next, as contributing to or compromising the handling of the accident; and lastly, as an explanation for the fatal outcome of all four crewmembers.

a. Hypoxia was pondered and discarded. Standard crew doctrine is that either the pilot or B/N will be on oxygen at all times even though the aircraft is pressurized. There have been enough episodes of cracked windshields and canopy panels that this rule is never violated. That the presurrization system failed slowly seems remote. It is possible but not probable since no yellow sheet entries noted such a discrepancy. Failure of the pressurization system has occurred in the past but was usually gradual in onset; i.e., recorded after several flights. Explosive decompression may have happened. Maintenance

ENCLOSURE (IX)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEDICAL OFFICER ON AAR 1-67A, HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON ONE TWO, THREE, OAK HARBOR, WASHINGTON (continued)

personnel who have been involved in other accidents in which engines disintegrated in flight have never known shrapnel to enter the fuselage in the region of the pressurization system. Had it occurred from a cracked canopy panel the aircraft dropped from 18,000 feet to impact point at 7,400 feet so rapidly that little effect could reasonably be expected as far as influencing the outcome.

b. Inflight fire has been suggested by the finding of one burned piece of fiberglass material from a fuel cell liner. On the other hand none of the tissue or personal equipment found bears any evidence of burning.

c. The crew apparently had eaten since an apple core was found in the wreckage. Review of the health records showed nothing related to hypoglycemic episodes in any of the crew.

d. The pilot, LCDR PARKS, was highly motivated and performing in an above average manner in the syllabus. Although he had had no previous experience in jet aircraft prior to his commencing jet instrument school in VF-126, he was considered to be a strong student. Whether or not any pilot could have averted disaster in this particular situation is an unanswerable rhetorical question.

In summary, no psychological or physiological factor is considered as causing the accident, contributing to it or significantly compromising any feature pertaining to its course.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This Flight Surgeon concurs with the recommendations of the AAR, particularly the expeditious installation of the Yankee extraction system.

2. Further recommendations will necessarily await the acquisition of more evidence from the accident site.

(b) (6)

LCDR MC USN

ENCLOSURE (IX)


LAKEVIEW
332°/72 NM
SQUAW PEAK
WARNER MOUNTAINS
SURPRISE VALLEY
2231.9|327|396
2251.5|339|449
2231.2|340|443
2230.7|342|446
2230.4|345|454
2230.1|349|459
2229.7|350|460
2229.4|352|463
2229.0|352|462
2228.7|351|464
EAGLE PEAK 9683
COLE PEAK
LAVERGNE PEAK
MODOC NATIONAL FOREST
MODOC COUNTY
LASSEN COUNTY
HAT MOUNTAIN
REDROCK MOUNTAIN
TIME/HDG/AIRSPEED
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVIN 3750.6B
Enclosure (2)

RESCUE REPORT — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST P3750.6E

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63) IIA 0107-601-7230 — INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE — OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, HEAVY ATTACK SQUADRON-123

2. DATE OF MISHAP: 5 April 1967 — 2A. DATE OF RESCUE: NONE

3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: A1°20 120° 15 SEARCH FOR MISSING AIRCREW

4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): SEE PARA 12.

5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: 100 EST — 5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR IN RESCUE TEAM: 20 EST — 5B. TO BE RESCUED: 0 — 5C. RESCUED: 0

6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS: FOREST SERVICE SNOW CAT

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)

	Method
7A. Alert Received: 0514310	SEATTLE CENTER LOST RADAR CONTACT
7B. Vehicle Departed: 0515590	Distance to Scene: 250 NM.
7C. Arrived on Scene: 0517290	Search Required: COMMENCE AIRBORNE SEARCH FOR POSS SURVIVORS
7D. Located Survivor: 0608300	Method of Locating: WRECKAGE SIGHTED BY LIGHT AIRCRAFT, C-W LINED BY A-6.
7E. Began Retrieval: 0608400	What Was Sighted First: FS #37 SERVICE "SNOW CAT" DIRECTED TO SITE BY RADIO FROM A-6.
7F. Ended Retrieval: 0816440	Subsequently: RESCUE ATTEMPT CLOSED
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3)

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE

8A. WATER TEMPERATURE	AIR TEMPERATURE	WIND VELOCITY
NA °F	10° - 30 °F	15 - 25 KTS.

8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY, TERRAIN DESCRIPTION: MOUNTAINOUS CRASH SITE ELEVATION 7000 - 7500 FEET MSL, HEAVILY TIMBERED.

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE: FOREST SERVICE "SNOW CAT".

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

AIRBORNE SEARCH HAMPERED BY LOW CLOUDS, SNOW AND RAIN. SURFACE SEARCH MOVEMENT RESTRICTED DUE TO DEEP AND DRIFTING SNOW.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, rentable, etc.
NONE		

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue team or crew, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

(1) THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS OF THIS CRASH.
(2) ALL SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITIES WERE DIRECTED BY WESTERN AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY CENTER, HAMILTON AFB.
(3) PARA 4. SEARCH AND RESCUE VEHICLES: (1) USAF C-130; (2) USAF HU-16; (1) USN HU-16; (1) USAF H-19; (2) USN CH-34; (2) USN A-6; (1) USN P-3.
(4) A CONSTANT AIRBORNE SEARCH WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL IDENTIFICATION OF DESTROYED AIRCRAFT WAS CONFIRMED.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL	SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL
LT (b) (6) ASST AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER	
15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL: J. P. SUNDERMAN, COMMANDING OFFICER	SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

OP-03



Enclosure (4)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) USN, (b) (6) concerning the aircraft accident involving an A3B, NJ309, (BUNO 138917) on 5 April 1967.

I was a passenger in NJ309 (BUNO 138917) on a scheduled flight from NAS Whidbey to NAS Miramar on 4 April 1967. Assigned crewmembers were LCDR D. E. KING, pilot in command; LCDR R. E. PARKS, FNP; and C. V. MILLER, ADJ3, plane captain. We manned the aircraft at 1950. LCDRS KING and PARKS conducted the pre-flight in company with MILLER. All of us were wearing at least the minimum required survival equipment, i.e., torso harness, MK3C, APH-5 or APH-6, oxygen mask, and survival vest. Seating positions were as follows: LCDR PARKS, pilot's seat; LCDR KING, B/N seat; LCDR (b) (6) C/N or 3rd seat; and MILLER, 4th seat.

Starting procedures, taxi, ATC clearance instructions, take-off, climb-out, and level-off were normal and check lists utilized where required. We were airborne at 2021 (local) according to my watch. LCDR PARKS leveled-off on the assigned altitude of FL 210, and set up a cruise speed of 450 KTAS. The flight progressed normally in all respects. LCDR PARKS seemed to have the aircraft under control at all times. The auto pilot was not used. On one occasion LCDR KING told LCDR PARKS to watch his altitude. I don't know how much he had deviated from the assigned flight level. In-flight checks were conducted at least once each 30 minutes and all systems were normal. LCDR KING remarked that he thought the ARC-27 UHF receiver was weak, but it sounded all right to me. Approaching the terminal area, LCDR PARKS asked LCDR KING if he should execute a tacan approach. LCDR KING said, "No, lets request a random radar penetration with a GCA hand-off. Its getting late and I'll give you a good work out tomorrow." The descent was routine and LCDR PARKS flew an excellent GCA. The landing touchdown was considerably harder than normal; however, in my opinion, it was not of sufficient magnitude to "down" the aircraft for a hard landing inspection. In addition, I was experiencing some physical discomfort in my abdomen due to recent surgery and a poor fitting torso harness; it had been nearly nine months since my last flight in A3B aircraft; and I was riding facing aft. These three factors possibly bear on my opinion as to how hard the landing was. LCDR KING acknowledged that the landing was hard by kidding LCDR PARKS about it. On the landing roll-out, LCDR PARKS asked LCDR KING if he should deploy the drag chute. LCDR KING's answer was rapid and emphatic, "Yes, on every landing!" The engines were shut down at 2255 (local). We went directly to the BOQ after closing out the flight plan. LCDR KING and I talked for a while, read for a few minutes and had the lights out on or about 2400. I don't know what time LCDR PARKS retired. He changed into civilian dress and said he was going to the TV lounge to watch the late movie. LCDR KING and I were awakened at 0700, dressed, had a substantial breakfast and reported to HCVW-12 at 0800 in company with LCDR (b) (6) I don't know what time LCDR PARKS arose. In my

Enclosure (5)

opinion, LCDR KING and PARKS occupied the same seats for the trip home. LCDR PARKS was scheduled to receive an instrument check either on the way to or from NAS Miramar. No emergency procedures were given by LCDR KING on the way down, and he twice told LCDR PARKS that "I'll work you hard tomorrow." I was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1953. I have approximately 4,800 hours of flight time, of which nearly 1,200 is in the A3B aircraft.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

MILITARY FLIGHT PLAN

AIRCRAFT UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT/HOME STATION

AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 153917

TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN: ☐ IFR ☐ DVFR ☐ VFR ☐ FVFR

RADIO CALL: N2307

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION TO CODE: A3/B

ESTIMATED TRUE AIRSPEED:

DEPARTURE TIME (Z): PROPOSED ACTUAL 2162Z

INITIAL CRUISING ALTITUDE: FL 220

POINT OF DEPARTURE: NAS MIRAMAR

STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE: NAME AND NUMBER: SAN PEDRO TWO

TO:

IFR	VFR	ROUTE OF FLIGHT	TO	ETE
X		315/9		
		FLAT OVER		

REMARKS

JET

VFR DEPARTURE WEST

280° Radial NKX TACAN

AFTER TAKE-OFF

RANK/RATE CODE:

PSGR/CARGO CODE:

HOURS FUEL ON BOARD	DIST TO DESTN	ALTERNATE AIR FIELD	ETE TO ALTN	NOTAMS	DD FORM 365F (Wt. and Bal.)	WEATHER	REQUEST CLEARANCE AFTER
3+30	(illegible)	McClellan AFB	0+10				

INST RATING	SIGNATURE OF PILOT IN COMMAND	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING AUTHORITY	DATE
SPEC	[signature]	(b) (6) Captain U. S. Navy	4-5-67

CREW/PASSENGER LIST — ☐ Attached ☐ See Passenger Manifest

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERVICE NO.	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION
PILOT IN COMMAND	PARES, R.E.	LCDR	(b) (6)	USN VA-113
	KING, D.E.	LCDR		" "
	MILLER, C.V. Jr.	ADJ3		" "
	READER, J.M.	LCDR.		" "

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6R

NAVAER 175 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

FLIGHT WEATHER BRIEFING

AIRCRAFT NO. 138917 | BRIEFING NO. 4-050 | DATE 4-5-67

I. TAKEOFF DATA

RUNWAY TEMP.	PRESSURE ALT.	TEMP. DEVIATION	VAPOR PRESSURE	SPECIFIC HUMIDITY	DENSITY ALTITUDE

CLIMB WINDS

REMARKS: IFR/NUW/ETD 2111Z/ETE 2+16/ JS SEA D→NUW.

II. ENROUTE DATA

FLIGHT LEVEL 22000' | TEMPERATURE | *WINDS NKX-RNO 250-50 RNO-LKV 220-25 LKV-SEA 050-15

CLOUDS AT FLIGHT LEVEL ____ ☐ YES ☑ NO ☐ IN AND OUT

VISIBILITY AT FLIGHT LEVEL ☐ HAZE ☐ DUST ☐ SMOKE ☐ PRECIPITATION

MINIMUM CEILING ENROUTE 1800 NUW FCST 3500' | MAXIMUM CLOUD TOPS 25,000' SCTD CB | MINIMUM FREEZING LEVEL 2500'

THUNDERSTORMS	TURBULENCE		PRECIPITATION			ICING	
☑ NONE	☑ NONE		☑ NONE			NONE	
FEW	☑ CAT	☑ LGT	RAIN		DRZL	☑ CLEAR	☑ LGT
SCATTERED	TSTM	MOD	SHOWERS		SNOW	RIME	MOD
NUMEROUS		SVR	FREEZING			MIXED	SVR
HAIL						☑ IN CLOUDS	

III. TERMINAL DATA

DESTINATION (Existing) NUW M18 @ 40 @ 70 @ 7 110/05 29.93

FORECAST 180 35 @ 7 VAIR @ 29.92 2330 Z TO 0130 Z

ALTERNATE (Existing) TCM M30 @ / @ 30 210/03 29.91

FORECAST 300 8 VAR/05 29.91 2340 Z TO 0140 Z

IV. COMMENTS/REMARKS

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (6)

(b) (6)

VOID TIME 2145Z | EXTENDED TO | BRIEFER

V. TELEVISION/TELEPHONE BRIEFING RECORD

WEATHER FACILITY SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B

TAPE NO.	START	STOP	PHONE CHARGE

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 175-1 0102-000-3390

TRANSCRIPTION OF ARTC CONTROLLER EVENTS 1406 to 1436 5 APRIL 67

TIME	CALLER	EVENT
1406.30	NJ309	"RENO 155°/78NM FL 180"
1419	OAKLAND CTR	Attempted 4 calls to NJ309 with no contact.
1427	OAKLAND CTR	Oakland Center advised Seattle Center that NJ309 was 10NM south of 41 - 00N. Seattle acknowledged radar contact.
1428.0	OAKLAND CTR	"NJ309 this Oakland over."
	NJ309	"Oakland 309, loud & clear."
	OAKLAND CTR	"NJ309, contact Seattle Center 306.3, over."
	NJ309	"309, roger 306.3"
1428.46	UNKNOWN	"GARBLED _ _ _FL 180"
1430.06	NJ309	"Seattle Center, NJ309 FL 180"
1430.20	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, roger, FL 180, sqwak IDENT"
1430.58	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, Seattle Center, over."
1432	SEATTLE CTR	"NJ309, Seattle Center, over."
1436		Seattle Center requests Lakeview to call NJ309 on UHF guard channel.

The times and events listed above are correct. Oral transmission are copied from abbreviated material and subject to variance, however, contents and purpose of transmission is specific.

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (7)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

Statement of Floyd NMN BROOKS, Rancher, Jess Valley, Modoc County, California

On 5 April about 2:30 P.M. I was working outside and heard an explosion and saw smoke from the area just above Soup Springs on the ridge line between the Springs and Mill Creek Meadows. About ten minutes before that I had heard a sonic boom. I did not at anytime see or hear an airplane. The weather was cloudy with snow flurries. I could see the ridge line but the top of Eagle Peak was hidden in the clouds. Several hours later I called the county sheriff in Alturas and reported the incident.

Floyd Brooks

The Board Considers This Statement Creditable

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (8)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E


PROJECTED FLIGHT PATH TO IMPACT POINT
9 FLIGHT PATH


9 - FLIGHT PATH


9 FLIGHT PATH

AIRCRAFT ENTRY ANGLE INTO IMPACT AREA



ENGINE PHOTOGRAPHS

VAH-123 SERIAL 1-67A 5 APRIL 1967 A-3B BUNO 133917 PILOT PARKS

ENCLOSURE (10) VIEWS SHOWING DAMAGE TO BOTH ENGINES
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6E



11.1 COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS

ATM - 50 - 1 MARKS INDICATING ROTATION



11-2 #2 ATM SCROLL

BURNED FIBERGLASS MATERIAL SHOWING NUMEROUS INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE INFLIGHT BURNING





Maintenance Officers Statement

A3B BUNO 138917 had accumulated 438.6 hours in 7 months of its current period. The last Calendar ODD Inspection was completed on 16 January 1967, and 246.3 hours had been flown since the completion of that inspection. Review of the last ten "B" sections of the OPNAV Form 3760-2 is not possible due to the loss of these flight records in the accident. The below tabulation listing discrepancies and corrective action taken or currently outstanding was extracted from the maintenance control master register. Both engines had normal oil consumption during this operating period.

Table of Aircraft Maintenance History Extracted from VAH-123 Maintenance Control Register for A3B BUNO 138917

DATE	JCN	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
22 MAR 67	470	HYD LEAK NLG DOOR	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	471	HYD LEAK TAIL SKAG	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	472	HYD LEAK PORT WING	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE.
22 MAR 67	475	HYD LEAK PORT MLG ACT	RESEALED PORT MLG ACT CYL
22 MAR 67	479	2 SMALL UTIL HYD STRAINERS #1 ADU CPT LEAKING	INSPECTED UTIL HYD FILTER FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF LEAK
22 MAR 67	515	HYD LEAK WING FOLD AREA	INSPECTED - NO EVIDENCE
22 MAR 67	556	WASH A/C	WASHED
23 MAR 67	755	STBD FIRE WRNG LITE ON ALL TIMES	REMOVED AND RE-INSTALLED STBD ENGINE. FOUND C/P IN PYLON SHORTED, REPAIR SAME. FOUND TEST SWITCH BAD, REPLACED. FOUND 3 ELEMENTS BAD AND 2 FLEXION CONNECTORS REPLACED. MEGGED & TESTED X'S GOOD.
25 MAR 67	929	HYD LEAK ON HYD FILTER IN #1 ADU CPT	TIGHTENED FILTER, TURNED X'ED GOOD
26 MAR 67	943	PORT ENG LATE TO START (18-2070) SUSPECT BAD IGNITER	CHANGED BOTH IGNITERS TURNED UP, X'ED GOOD
(27 MAR 67 & 3 APR 67)	074 917	OUTBOARD PORT BLEED VALVE LOWER RIVET SHEERED	REPLACED BROKEN SEAL RING AND POPPED RIVET

Enclosure (12)

DATE	JCN	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
29 MAR 67	278	2 WET STARTS PRIOR TO SUCCESSFUL LITE OFF STBD ENG	CHECK IGNITION SWITCH FOR CORRECT ADJ. CYCLED IGNITION TIMER THRU 4 TIMES. RUN FOR 30 SEC EACH TIME. TURNED UP 2 TIMES, NO MALFUNCTION, I GOOD
29 MAR 67	315	#1 ADU LOOSE	TIGHTENED TOP MOUNT BOLT AND RE-SAFETIED
30 MAR 67	399	NOSE GEAR ALT CYL LEAKING SLIGHTLY	T/U NO LEAKAGE FROM RUNNING NOSE GEAR THRU 7 OR 8 TIMES
30 MAR 67	510	CHECK RUN DOWN TIME ON PORT ENG, CLOCK MAY BE OFF	REPAIRED SHORTED C/P ON PORT TACH GEN. ALSO XED TACH IND AND GEN. BY SUBSTITUTION RUN DOWN TIME 44 SEC WITH A/C PARTS AND NEW PARTS.
31 MAR 67	684	ADU OIL LEAK BY PORT BLAKE HINGE	CHANGED #1 ADU GOVERNOR T. U. AND X'ED FOR LEAKS AND PROPER OPERATION, X'S OK
31 MAR 67	685	HORIZ STBD ACT OIL LEAK	SERVICED ACT FOUND NO LEAKS, X'S GOOD
31 MAR 67	707	SEVERAL SOFT SPOTS IN RADOME	
2 APR 67	771	STBD FIRE WARN LITE ON	DRIED OUT SHORT PIGTAILS SYSTEM X'S GOOD
3 APR 67	810	FIRE WARN LITE STBD ENG NO IND OF FIRE OR OVER TEMP ON VIS INSP TURNED ENG FOR ABOUT 7-8 MIN ELECT X FOR LOOSE OR WET CONNECTORS. LIGHT REMAINS ON.	FLEX LEAD BAD. REPLACED 4 FLEX LEADS. X'S GOOD
3 APR 67	914	#1 ADU AC FREQ 380 #2 ADU AC FREQ 410 AT IDLE	RESET FREQ'S IN #1 & #2 ADU'S
(3 APR 67 & 4 APR 67)	916	ADU OIL LEAK	CHANGED #2 AC GEN GASKET SEALS AND OIL PUNGE GASKET
4 APR 67	953	REMOVED & REPLACED AC GEN	REMOVED & REPLACED #2 GEN X'S GOOD ON TURN

(b) (6)

(b) (6) USN
LCDR
2 Maint. Officer

Enclosure (12)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

[illegible] CONTROL [illegible] PUMP [illegible]
[illegible] SUBASSEMBLY PARTS SHOWED NO HEAT
[illegible] FAILURE.
[illegible] BALANCE BUNGEE ASSEMBLY P/N [illegible]
[illegible] THAT COMPRESSION [illegible]
[illegible] MISSING. NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON
[illegible]

[illegible] HAD DUAL INDICATORS. THE LEFT-HAND [illegible] SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF SHIELD REVEALED [illegible] HAD BEEN DISENGAGED SO THAT NOTHING [illegible] ABOUT POINTER IMPACT POSITION. RIGHT-HAND POINTER WAS INTACT AND ITS POSITION INDICATED READING OF 158 DEGREES, HOWEVER, [illegible] POSITION IS AGAINST UPPER LIMIT STOP AND [illegible] NOT CERTAIN. NO SIGNIFICANT MARKS OBSERVED UNDER [illegible]

[illegible] WAS RECOVERED FROM THE ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATOR. [illegible] INDICATED OFF. ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SETTING WAS [illegible] SO NO DETERMINATION OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATION COULD BE MADE.

[illegible] OF FUEL FLOW INDICATOR AVAILABLE. THE POINTER [illegible]

[illegible] NO DETERMINATION OF IMPACT INDICATION POSSIBLE. [illegible] NOTHING.

[illegible] HAD SPHERE DISTORTED SUCH THAT [illegible] ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT WAS VERTICAL AND TAIL [illegible] SUGGESTED, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A [illegible] WOULD ASSUME THE ORIENTATION OBSERVED [illegible]

[illegible] SHOWED AN INDICATION OF [illegible] MILES [illegible] TO VERIFY THIS INDICATION BY MEASURING [illegible] OF THE RESOLVER POTENTIOMETERS WAS NOT POSSIBLE [illegible] BROKEN INSIDE. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE FIRST [illegible] OF THE INDICATION ARE CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE [illegible] BY PLUS THREE, MINUS FOUR.

[illegible] FAILURE BETWEEN TWO ROTOR PARTS OF DUE [illegible] INDICATES UNIT ROTATING AT MOMENT OF IMPACT.

[illegible] OF DC GENERATOR BEARINGS WAS CONCENTRATED [illegible] STATIONARY AXIAL IMPACT, WITH GENERATOR [illegible] NO MARKS ON ARMATURE INDICATING ROTATION [illegible]

[illegible] AIR DUCT SEGMENT WITH COUPLING RECEIVED

[illegible]
[illegible] ONLY [illegible] DAMAGE.
[illegible] PUMP WAS RUNNING AT IMPACT.
[illegible] INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE. CYLINDER HAD NOT [illegible]

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 5500.[illegible]

B033/27
ZCTFA701
RTTH JAW RUWMHV#3132 1170103-UUUU--RUWM[illegible]
ZNR UUUUU
R 270102Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWMFTA/PATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUEOHRA/NATSF PHILA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWJAPA/COMREADAIRCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NPRO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NPRO EAST HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131800Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. MY 191918Z APR 67
C. FONECON LCDR (b) (6) VAH-123 AND MR. BRIGHT THIS FACILITY
1. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NUMBER 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS. REF B WAS A PARTIAL REPORT. THIS REPORT COVERS REMAINING ITEMS.
2. SECOND DC GENERATOR RECEIVED WITH ROTOR MISSING. UNABLE DETERMINE IF ROTOR TURNING AT IMPACT.

PAGE 2 RUWMHV#3132 UNCLAS
3. EMERGENCY ESCAPE CHUTE IMPULSE CARTRIDGE EX-82-0 WITH INKED DATE 10-28-67 WAS TESTED AND FIRED WITHIN VOLTAGE AND CURRENT LIMITS.
4. REF C REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING THREE ADDITIONAL ITEMS BE INCLUDED IN REPORT:
   A. AIM SHROUD SHOWED DEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT.
   B. SUPPORT ASSEMBLY, CONTROL COLUMN AFT 4272754, BEARING AN0202KP47B, AND RETAINER NAS669-387 SHOWED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
   C. PIECE OF BURNT WOVEN MATERIAL WAS IDENTIFIED AS FIBERGLAS CLOTH IMPREGNATED WITH POLYESTER RESIN BINDER AND NYLON WOVEN FABRIC. THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE PART OF A FUEL CELL TANK LINER. TEMPERATURE OF BURNING ESTIMATED BETWEEN 500 AND 600 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AS EVIDENCED BY CHARRED REMAINS OF NYLON AND TOTALLY BURNT POLYESTER RESIN BINDER.
5. THIS COMPLETES NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA ACTION ON CONTROL 3282-67.
BT

Apr 27 05 03:67

"INTERNAL ROUTING CORRECT AND TAKE FOR C VICE SUP.

Certified to be true
(b) (6)
LCDR USN

CFW C/S ADMIN OPS OPCON AMO SUP CON SDO
VAH-123 AT WU/DL

Enclosure (13)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

RESUME OF PILOT EXPERIENCE PAST FIVE YEARS

LCDR R. E. PARKS (b) (6)

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LNDGS DAY/NIGHT	TYPE
US NAVAL POST GRAD SCHOOL	APR 1962 MAY 1963	TC-45J T-28	113	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VA-42	JULY 1963 DEC 1963	A-1H	144	16/8	OPERATIONAL
VA-176	DEC 1963 JAN 1966	A-1H	848	177/79	OPERATIONAL
USS LEXINGTON	JAN 1966 OCT 1966	C-1A	104	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VF-126	NOV 1966 DEC 1966	TF-9J	46	NONE	OPERATIONAL
VAH-123	DEC 1966 APR 1967	A3B	25	NONE	OPERATIONAL

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (14)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

RESUME OF PILOT EXPERIENCE PAST FIVE YEARS

LCDR D. E. KING (b) (6)

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	CV LNDGS DAY/NIGHT	TYPE
VAH-10	APRIL 1962 JUNE 1963	A3B	261	160*	OPERATIONAL
US NAVAL POST GRAD SCHOOL	JULY 1963 DEC 1964	T2A	150	NONE	PROFICIENCY
BUPERS	JAN 1965 OCT 1965	T1A	61	NONE	PROFICIENCY
VAH-123	NOV 1965 APR 1967	A3B/A6A	530	14/6	OPERATIONAL

*ONLY ONE LOG BOOK AVAILABLE

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

From: Officer in Charge, Naval Weather Service Environmental Detachment, Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, Washington
To: Aviation Safety Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ONE TWO THREE

Subj: Summary of weather at and near site of A3B aircraft crash in Northern California mountains on 5 April 1967

1. The following is a summary of available weather observations as well as estimates and opinions of the weather that most likely occurred at points where no observations were available:

GENERAL SYNOPTIC SITUATION: During the afternoon of 5 April 1967 an upper-air closed low pressure cell was centered just off the Northern Oregon coast. This low was nearly stationary. The circulation around this upper-level low extended far enough to the South and East so as to overlie all of Oregon, Nevada, and California. Although no definite fronts appeared on the surface chart at this time at or near the area of interest, rather widespread unsettled, unstable surface and low level weather conditions did prevail over most of Western Nevada, Northern California, and Southern Oregon.

SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS: Interpolation based on actual upper wind observations taken at 051800Z and 060000Z indicate that the 18,000-feet wind between Reno and Lakeview should have been from 240 degrees true at 35 to 40 knots. Reno, at 2200Z and 2300Z, reported only one layer of clouds. These clouds, based at 3400 feet above the ground, probably had tops no higher than 7000 or 8000 feet. However, on both of these observations Reno carried the remark, "ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY". Rotor clouds are normally associated with mountain wave conditions or other extremely turbulent conditions. Mountain waves and rotor clouds are usually observed over or on the lee side of mountainous terrain. Although Reno did not estimate a height of these rotor clouds, they might well have been between 14,000 and 24,000 feet. It is probable that considerable turbulence existed in and near these clouds.

Continuing Northward from Reno toward Lakeview an increase in low and middle clouds should have been encountered. This is an opinion based on rather sparse data since there aren't many weather observation stations on or near the route from Reno to Lakeview. A review of the weather reported by the stations in Northern California and Southern Oregon during the time in question reveals that most of the peaks and ridges higher than 5000 feet above sea level were probably obscured by low clouds and snow showers. Tops of all low and middle clouds were most likely 13,000 to 14,000 feet. A higher broken to overcast relatively dense cirrus cloud layer with bases about 26,000 feet and tops about 32,000 feet was observed over most of Northern California and Southern Oregon.

REPORTED OBSERVATIONS:

LKV 2043Z EST 1500 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT SNOW, TEMP 35, DP 28, WIND 200/7

LKV 2345Z 3000 SCTD EST 5000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 30 MI, TEMP 48, DP 19, WIND 180/10

LMT 2200Z 3000 SCTD EST 5000 BKN 12,000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 10 MI, LIGHT SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 40, DP 25, WIND 190/6, VISIBILITY LOWER SW-NW AND N, SNOW SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY VERY LIGHT

LMT 2300Z 2800 SCTD EST 5000 BKN 12,000 BKN HI OVC CIRRUS, 10 MI, TEMP 38, DP 26, WIND 280/13, CEILING RAGGED, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY N AND E-SE

SIY 2116Z 1500 SCTD MEASURED 2500 BKN 4500 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS, WIND 260/15G20

SIY 2200Z 2000 SCTD EST 3500 BKN 5000 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS, TEMP 42, DP 32, WIND 200/15G20, CEILING RAGGED, LIGHT RAIN SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY VERY LIGHT

SIY 2300Z 3000 SCTD EST 4500 BKN 8000 OVC, 20 MI, TEMP 40, DP 33, WIND 190/10G17, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY NE

MHS 2200Z 1500 SCTD EST 3000 OVC, 4 MI, LIGHT RAIN AND SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 36, DP 34, WIND 130/13, RAIN BEGAN 2110Z

MHS 2300Z INDEFINITE 1000 OBSCURED, ½ MI, MODERATE SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 35, DP 34, WIND 140/8, RAIN ENDED 2245Z, MODERATE SNOW SHOWERS OCCASIONALLY LIGHT

BNY 2020Z 500 SCTD EST 1500 BKN 10,000 OVC, 15 MI, LIGHT RAIN, WIND 250/10, LOWER CLOUDS W-SW, PASS OBSCURED

RNO 2200Z EST 3400 BKN, 25 MI, TEMP 47, DP 22, WIND 190/18, ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY, SNOW SHOWERS OF UNKNOWN INTENSITY NE-SE, CLOUDS TOPPING SIERRA NEVADAS

RNO 2300Z EST 3400 BKN, 25 MI, TEMP 47, DP 22, WIND 200/13, ROTOR CLOUDS OVER VALLEY, CLOUDS TOPPING SIERRA NEVADAS

LKV - LAKEVIEW, ELEVATION 4764 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
LMT - KLAMATH FALLS, ELEVATION 4084 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
SIY - MONTAGUE, CALIF, ELEVATION 2651 FT ABOVE SEA LEVEL
MHS - MOUNT SHASTA, ELEVATION 3587 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL
BNY - BURNEY, CALIF, ELEVATION 3100 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL
RNO - RENO, ELEVATION 4400 FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL

(b) (6)

Lieutenant Commander, USN

Statement of Capt. (b) (6) , (b) (6) USAF, 322ND FIGHTER SQUADRON, Kingsley AFB, Oregon.

On 5 April 1967 I departed the base at around 1430 on a practice scramble in a F-101. Following handoff from departure control, Seattle Center requested I climb to FL 200 and vector 100° to effect a communications search with NJ309. I steered 100° for approximately 100NM with no communications results. Weather at FL 200 was IFR with only occasional light turbulence. At infrequent intervals I could momentarily see cloud layers below. I would estimate the weather a FL 180 to be similar with a little more intermittent VFR/IFR conditions.

I am currently flying F-101's and have a total of 3700 flight hours.

(b) (6)

Certified to be true

(b) (6)

LCDR USN

Enclosure (16)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6E

NNNNNZCNASC489CZCSLB983
PTTUZYUW RUWMFTA0042 2982314-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 252314Z OCT 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUEDBRB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWMHVA/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWMHVA/CARAEWRON THIRTEEN
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
BT
UNCLAS
PRIORITY INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRPACINST 4730.8A
B. NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC 280121Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
C. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA (300) DIR REPORT 554 (NOTAL)
1. A3B 138917

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0042 UNCLAS
2. NA
3. HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR S/R UNKNOWN
4. S/N RQ1680-739-5067-ADGA P/N 5380-824-549
5. DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CO.
6. UNKNOWN
7. THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF REF B. FURTHER SEARCH RECOVERED REMAINING PART OF TRIM ACTUATOR. OTHER PART OF TRIM ACTUATOR REPORTED ON IN REF C.
8. REQUEST DIR IAW REF A.
BT

#489/67

C of G M+M

OCT

252314Z

VAH-123 4-5-67 Purdue

NNNNZCZCNASC729CSLA038
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5959 200220A-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 192204Z JUL 67
FM NAVACREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCRARIWING ONE TWO
RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFCEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/504/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 280121Z JUN 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO. 3282-67 REQ AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS ON MAIN FUEL CONTROL, P/N 507650-L16, S/N 20112, REMOVED FROM ONE ENGINE OF SUBJ

729/67

Copy to M+M Records

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA5959 UNCLAS
A/C.
2. INVESTIGATION REVEALED:
A. FUEL CONTROL SUFFERED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
B. CONTROL MECHANISMS (CONTROL SHAFT, LINKAGE, BRACKET, AND LEVER ASSY, ETC.) WERE MISSING.
C. FUEL STRAINERS WERE CLEAN.
D. PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE - CLOSED POSITION (NORMAL). NO DISCREPANCIES.
E. FLYWEIGHT GOVERNOR ASSY - NO DISCREPANCIES.
F. CYLINDER CAM SPEED SENSOR - NO DISCREPANCIES.
3. CONCLUDE: DETERMINATION OF FUEL CONTROL OPERABILITY OR MALFUNCTION PRIOR TO IMPACT NOT FEASIBLE DUE TO MUTILATED CONDITON OF PARTS.
4. THIS IS A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS PRIORITY DIR NO. 31 OF 12 MAY 1967.
BT

JUL 1922047

VAH-123

Returned

4-5-67
Clark

NNNNZCZCNASC233LB850
RTTE JAW RUWJMUA8621 1790121-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE
R 280121Z JUN 67
FM NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
TO RUWMFIA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
ZEN1/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUWMFIA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO L BEACH (DOUGLAS ACFT CO, INC)
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD (PRATT AND WHITNEY ACFT DIV, UNITED
ACFT CORP CONN)
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
A3B BUNO 138917 ACFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. HATRON-123 240233Z JUN 67
B. HATRON-123 110345Z APR 67
1. HATRON-123: REQ FWD REF A FUEL CONTROL, S/N 20112, TO NAVAIREWORKFAC
NORIS CUSTOMER SERVICE CODE 523.2, AND HORIZONTAL TRIM ACTUATOR,

233/67

AAR

Copy RECORDS

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA8621 UNCLAS E F T O
P/N DG5380824-549, TO NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA CUSTOMER SERVICE CODE
524.1. REF B REFERS. MARK CONTAINERS AND DOCUMENTS FOR PRIORITY
DIR IAW REF C. ADCON SHIPPING MODE AND TCN OR B/L NRS. REFER
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC CONTROL NR 3282-67.
2. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS: REQ CONDUCT ENGRG ANAL SUBJ FUEL CONTROL,
S/N 20112, P/N 507658L-16, IAW REF C. ADCON RESULTS. REFER ABOVE
CONTROL NR ALL FUTURE RELATED CORRES.
3. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA: REQ CONDUCT ENGRG ANAL SUBJ HORIZONTAL
TRIM ACTUATOR, P/N DG5380824-549, IAW REF C. ADCON RESULTS. REFER
ABOVE CONTROL NR ALL FUTURE RELATED CORRES.
BT

280121Z

NNNN,I;-:64CZCSLA450
RITU JAW RUWJMUA1396 1182356-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 282356Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
RUCILSA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORVA
RUCILWA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/53613
A3B BUNO 138917 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. TELCON LT. [redacted] VAH-123/S. BROWN NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS ON

#564/67

Cg M&M

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA1396 UNCLAS
27 APR 67
B. MY 220118Z APR 67 NOTAL
1. REF A REQ CONFIRM INCORP OF J57 ENG BULL NO. 535 AMEND - 1 IN
J57-P10 ENGS S/N'S P607625 AND P632289 INSTALLED IN SUBJ A/C
AT TIME OF ACCIDENT. REF B IS PRELIMINARY PRI DIR ON NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
CONTROL NO. 3282-67.
2. HISTORY:
A. ENG. S/N P607625; NORIS SHOPS ENG. ASSY RECORD
INDICATES J57 E.B. 535-A1 INCORP. CERTIFIED 7-9-66; NEW FORM 13090/40
INDICATES INCORP E.B. 535-A1 2-3-64 AND CERTIFIED 7-9-66.
B. S/N P632289; NORIS SHOPS ENG. ASSY RECORD INDICATES
J57 E.B. 535-A1 INCORP. CERTIFIED 7-11-66; NW FORM 13090/40
INDICATES INCORP E.B. 535-A1 9-25-65 AND CERTIFIED 7-11-66.
3. PORTIONS OF THE ENGINES AFFECTED BY E.B. 535-A1 WERE NOT RECEIVED:
THEREFORE INSPECTION COULD NOT VERIFY PHYSICAL INCORP. OF BULLETIN.
BT

A3B 138917

APR
282356Z

NNNNZCZCNASC225CZCSLB099
RTTU JAW RUWMHVA3132 1170103-UUUU--RUCILSA. 225/67
ZNR UUUUU
R 270102Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORTH
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUEOHRA/NATSF PHILA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NPRO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NPRO EAST HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. MY 191918Z APR 67
C. FONECON LCDR (b) (6) VAH-123 AND MR. BRIGHT THIS FACILITY
1. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NUMBER 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS. REF B WAS A PARTIAL REPORT. THIS REPORT COVERS REMAINING ITEMS.
2. SECOND DC GENERATOR RECEIVED WITH ROTOR MISSING. UNABLE DETERMINE IF ROTOR TURNING AT IMPACT.

Cog. M&M
VAH 123
A3B 138917
4-5-67
1-6717

PAGE 2 RUWMHVA3132 UNCLAS
3. EMERGENCY ESCAPE CHUTE IMPULSE CARTRIDGE EX-82-0 WITH INKED DATE 10-28-67 WAS TESTED AND FIRED WITHIN VOLTAGE AND CURRENT LIMITS.
4. REF C REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING THREE ADDITIONAL ITEMS BE INCLUDED IN REPORT:
   A. ATM SHROUD SHOWED DEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT.
   B. SUPPORT ASSEMBLY, CONTROL COLUMN AFT 4272754, BEARING AN202KP478, AND RETAINER S669-387 SHOWED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
   C. PIECE OF BURNT WOVEN MATERIAL WAS IDENTIFIED AS FIBERGLAS CLOTH IMPREGNATED WITH POLYESTER RESIN BINDER AND NYLON WOVEN FABRIC. THIS WAS DETERMINED TO BE PART OF A FUEL CELL TANK LINER. TEMPERATURE OF BURNING ESTIMATED BETWEEN 500 AND 600 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AS EVIDENCED BY CHARRED REMAINS OF NYLON AND TOTALLY BURNT POLYESTER RESIN BINDER.
5. THIS COMPLETES NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA ACTION ON CONTROL 3282-67.
BT

APR 67
270102Z

NNNNMZCNASC337CZCSLA425
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA6188 1120118-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 220118Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
TO ZEN1/NAVAIRSXSCOMREPAC
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWMHVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREDATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ PASS TO AIR-4113/53613
ASB BUNO 138817 A/C ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67
1. REF A CONTROL NO 3282-67 REQ FAILURE ANALYSIS ON J57-P10 ENGINES S/N'S P607625 AND P632289 REMOVED FROM SUBJ A/C.
2. AS RECEIVED BOTH ENGINES REVEALED MAJOR IMPACT DAMAGE.

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA6188 UNCLAS
A. INVESTIGATION INDICATED ENG S/N P607625 WAS STOPPED OR LOW RPM AT IMPACT. ENG S/N P632289 WAS ROTATING AT IMPACT.
B. NO. 1 MAIN BEARING BOTH ENGINES NOT RECEIVED. ALL OTHER MAIN BEARINGS BOTH ENGINES FOUND IN SATISFACTORY CONDITION EXCEPT FOR IMPACT DAMAGE.
3. CONCLUDE INVESTIGATION OF ENGINE COMPONENTS AS RECEIVED REVEALED NO INDICATIONS OF MALFUNCTION.
4. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING.
5. FORMAL PRI DIR TO BE SUBMITTED APPROX 5 MAY 1967.
BT

837]67

COG: M&M

APR 220118

NNNNZCZCNASC669973
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA5708 1102226-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 202226Z APR 67
FM COMNAVAIRPAC
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
INFO RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
BT
UNCLAS
ASB BUNO 138917 AAR
A. YOUR 200318Z APR 67
1. EXTENSION GRANTED AS REQ REF A.
BT

669/67

Corp Records

SER 202226Z

NNNNMZCNASC581
RTTU JAW RUWMFTA0043 1100318-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 200318Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
BT
UNCLAS
A3B BUNO 138917 AAR
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E
1. REQ 10 WORKING DAY EXTENSION SUBJ RPT.
BT

#521/67
COA RECORDS

AM
200182

ZNR UUUUU
R 191918Z APR 67
FM NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCONREPAC
INFO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
RUWJMUA/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOM
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC PHILA
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN NORVA
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO EAST HARTFORD
ZEN/COMFAIRALAMEDA
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 FAILURE ANALYSIS
A. YOUR 131804Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
B. HATRON ONE TWO THREE 110345Z APR 67 (NOTAL)
1. NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA TAKES REF A FOR ACTION.
2. REF A REQUESTED FAILURE ANALYSIS CONTROL NO. 3282-67 OF SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS FROM ACCIDENT REPORTED REF B. THIS IS A PARTIAL REPORT. REMAINING ITEMS WILL BE REPORTED WHEN ANALYSIS COMPLETED.
3. BOTH AIR TURBINE MOTORS WERE TURNING AT IMPACT. PRESSURIZATION TURBINE WAS TURNING AT IMPACT.

PAGE TWO RUWMHVA2572 UNCLAS
4. AILERON BOOST AND SURFACE CONTROL HYDRAULIC PUMP P/N A265319R6 BROKEN FROM IMPACT. ROTATING GROUP SUBASSEMBLY PARTS SHOWED NO HEAT DISCOLORATION OR EVIDENCE OF SEIZURE.
5. COCKPIT CONTROL BOBWEIGHT BALANCE BUNGEE ASSEMBLY P/N 4954AG3 HAD ONE-EIGHTH INCH DEEP DENT ON CASE SO THAT COMPRESSION LOAD TEST NOT POSSIBLE. SAFETY WIRING ON CAP MISSING. NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND ON INTERNAL PARTS.
6. THE PORT OIL TEMPERATURE GAGE HAD DUAL INDICATORS. THE LEFT-HAND POINTER WAS CRUMPLED BENEATH SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF SHIELD REVEALED THAT ENTIRE POINTER MOVEMENT HAD BEEN DISENGAGED SO THAT NOTHING POSITIVE COULD BE DETERMINED ABOUT POINTER IMPACT POSITION. RIGHT-HAND POINTER WAS INTACT AND ITS POSITION INDICATED READING OF 150 DEGREES, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THIS POSITION IS AGAINST UPPER LIMIT STOP AND VALIDITY OF READING NOT CERTAIN. NO SIGNIFICANT MARKS OBSERVED UNDER BLACK LIGHT.
7. ONLY THE DIAL FACE WAS RECOVERED FROM THE ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATOR. ELECTRICAL POWER FLAG INDICATED OFF. ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SETTING WAS 23.5 UNITS. POINTER WAS MISSING SO NO DETERMINATION OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INDICATION COULD BE MADE.
8. ONLY THE DIAL FACE OF FUEL FLOW INDICATOR AVAILABLE. THE POINTER WAS MISSING SO THAT NO DETERMINATION OF IMPACT INDICATION POSSIBLE. BLACK LIGHT EXAMINATION REVEALED NOTHING.
9. THE REMOTE ATTITUDE INDICATOR (VGI) HAD SPHERE DISTORTED SUCH THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE IMPACT ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT WAS VERTICAL AND TAIL DOWN. WHILE NO CORRELATION IS SUGGESTED, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A TYPICAL UNIT WITH POWER REMOVED WOULD ASSUME THE ORIENTATION OBSERVED IN THE DAMAGED UNIT.
10. THE ID-310/ARN TACAN INDICATOR SHOWED AN INDICATION OF 076 MILES WHEN RECEIVED HOWEVER ATTEMPTS TO VERIFY THIS INDICATION BY MEASURING THE RESISTANCE SETTING OF THE RESOLVER POTENTIOMETERS WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE POTENTIOMETERS WERE BROKEN INSIDE. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE FIRST TWO DIGITS OF THE INDICATION ARE CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE UNITS DIGIT MAY BE IN ERROR BY PLUS THREE, MINUS FOUR.
11. MODE OF FASTENING SCREW FAILURE BETWEEN TWO ROTOR PARTS OF ONE AC GENERATOR, INDICATES UNIT ROTATING AT MOMENT OF IMPACT.
12. BRINELLING ON RACE WAYS OF DC GENERATOR BEARINGS WAS CONCENTRATED ON A SMALL AREA INDICATING STATIONARY AXIAL IMPACT, WITH GENERATOR NOT ROTATING. THERE WERE NO MARKS ON ARMATURE INDICATING ROTATION AT IMPACT.
13. THE EIGHT-INCH-LONG BLEED AIR DUCT SEGMENT WITH COUPLING RECEIVED INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE.
14. WING FUEL BOOST PUMP WAS RUNNING AT IMPACT.
15. ESCAPE CHUTE CYLINDER INDICATED ONLY IMPACT DAMAGE. CYLINDER HAD NOT BEEN FIRED.
BT

NNNNZCZCNASC923SLB077
RTTU JAW RUWJMUA8884 1031804-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
R 131804Z APR 67
FM NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
TO RUWMFTA/HATRON ONE TWO THREE
ZEN1/NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS
RUWMKVA/NAVAIREWORKFAC ALAMEDA
INFO RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN1/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWMFTA/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LONG BEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
BT
UNCLAS
A-3B BUNO 138917 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A. HATRON 123 1103452 APR 67 FASEP
B. COMNAVAIRPAC/BWFRRPAC INST 4730.8A
1. HATRON 123: REQ FWD REF A ENGINES TO NAVAIREWORKFAC
NORIS AND SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS TO NAVAIREWROKFAC ALAMEDA.

PAGE TWO RUWJMUA8884 UNCLAS
MARK CONTAINERS AND DOCUMENTS FOR PRIORITY DIR IAW REF B.
ADCON SHIPPING MODE AND DOCUMENT NRS. REFER NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
CONTROL NR 3282-67.
2. NAVAIREWORKFAC NORIS: REQ CONDUCT FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUBJ ENGINES S/NS P607625 AND P632289 IAW REF B. ADCON
RESULTS. ABOVE CONTROL NR ASGD.
3. NAVAIREWROKFAC ALAMEDA: REQ CONDUCT FAILURE ANALYSIS
REF A SELECTED AIRCRAFT PARTS IAW REF B. ADCON RESULTS.
ABOVE CONTROL NR ASGD.
BT

923/67

M.M
A.I

AB
131804Z

NNNNZCZCNABC536CZCBLP053
PTTU JAV RUWMFTA0043 101034R-UUUU--RUCILBA
ZNR UUUUU
P R 110342Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUEKAAA/CNO
RUCILBA/NAVAVNRAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATXCARIARWING TWELVE
RMEOPDA/DIR AFIP
RUCIJPA/SUPERB
RUWJNOA/NAVPLANTREPO LOKAPH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO HARTFORD
RUEDBHD/CHNAVMAT
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT NR 3NOF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0043 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
B. 060300Z PASEP
C. 060340Z PASEP
D. 090034Z PASEP
1. PARA 1 THRU 6 AND 9 THRU 11 REMAIN THE SAME
2. PARA 7, PORT ENGINE FAILURE AND/OR DUAL ATM FAILURE SUSPECTED
CAUSE FACTOR
3. PARA 8, YES
4. PARA 10, ENGINES (J-57 P-10) SN P-687625 AND SN P-638089)
ATM'S WITH ACCESSORIES) FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS, FORWARDED FOR DIR.
BT

536167
SUPP
AAR
AAR
110342Z
A3
VAH-123

NNNNZCZCNASC542LQ
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0046 1010345-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 110345Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUWJMUA/NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC
INFO RUWJMUA/COMNAVEIRPAC
RUEOHRA/NAVAIRTECHSERVFAC
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDDPA/NAVPLANTREPO E HARTFORD
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJMUA/NAS NORIS
RUWMHVA/NAS ALAMEDA
BT
UNCLAS
PRIORITY INVESTIGATION
A. BWFRRPAC 4730.8A
B. OPNAVINST P3750.6E
C. BUWEPINST 4700.2A
D. TELECON NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC WHIDBEY IS.
BQM A-3B 138917

542 67

Cog: M&M

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0046 UNCLAS
2. J57P10 S/R P607625
J57P10 S/R P632289
3. 2 FUEL PUMPS
2 FUEL CONTROLS
2 BLEED VALVE GOV
1 ATM ROTOR AND EXHAUST DUCT
1 D/C GEN
1 A/C GEN COIL
COCKPIT INST: TACAN, VGI, STBY GYRO
4. OMITTED
5. OMITTED
6. OMITTED
7. ACFT ENROUTE FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS. FL 180. 1 PLUS 15 AFTER TAKEOFF CENTER CONTROLLER OBSERVED ON RADAR LEFT DEVIATION FROM COURSE FOLLOWED BY LOST CONTACT. WRECKAGE DISCOVERED NEXT DAY. NO SURVIVORS. SUSPECT CATASTROPHIC PORT ENG. FAILURE AND/OR DUAL ATM FAILURE.
8. REQUEST PRIORITY INVESTIGATION IAW BWFRRPACINST 4730.8A AND OPNAVINST P3750.6E
BT

APR
110345Z

ZNR NECNASC419SLB738
PTIU JAW RUWMFTA0010 0990234-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 090234Z A PR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJAPA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING ONE TWO
RUEDPDA/DIR AFIP
RUCIJFA/BUPERS
RUWJNDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDBHB/CHNAVMAT
BT
UNCLAS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT NR 2 OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0010 UNCLAS
B. MY 060300Z APR 67 (PASEP)
C. MY 062340Z APR 67 (PASEP)
1. PARA 1 THRU 9 AND 11 REMAIN THE SAME
2. PARA 10 BAILOUT ATTEMPT UNDETERMINED
3. PARA 12, PILOT RICHARD EARL PARKS, LCDR, (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL; DONALD EDWIN KING, LCDR, (b) (6) , USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL, INSTRUCTOR PILOT; CARL VIRGIL MILLER JR., ADJ3, (b) (6) USN, ACTIVE, FATAL, PLANE CAPTAIN; JAMES MERRITT READER, LCDR, (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, FATAL, PAX; AAR BOARD AT SCENE
BT

419/67
AAR
APR
090234Z
A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67A 4-5-67

NNNNTSCNA5C144CZCSLA421
PTTU JAW RUWMFTA0095 0962340-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 062340Z APR 67
FM HATRON ONE TWO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUWMMEA/COMTWELVE
RUCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT
RUEDBHB/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMFAIRWHIDBEY
RUWJMFA/COMREADATKCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUWJMDA/NAVPLANTREPO LBEACH
RUEDBNB/CHNAVMAT
RUEDPDA/DIR AFIP
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6E
B. 260300Z APR 67 NOTAL
1. A3B, 138917, VAH-123, 1-67A, PARKS.

PAGE TWO RUWMFTA0095 UNCLAS
2. NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS, IFR, 1 PLUS 15.
3. ALFA.
4. ACFT COLLISION WITH GROUND.
5. PILOTS FILED J-5 FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY, IFR, FLT LEVEL 180. COMMUNICATIONS WERE GOOD UNTIL OAKLAND CENTER CLEARED ACFT TO SWITCH TO SEATTLE CENTER. NO RADIO CONTACT WAS MADE WITH SEATTLE CENTER. AT 1431U, SEATTLE CENTER LOST RADAR CONTACT. NORAD ALSO LOST RADAR CONTACT AT 1432U. NORAD REPORTED THE ACFT CHANGED GROUND SPEED FROM 443 KTS AT 1431U TO 396 KTS AT 1432U, AND CHANGED TRACK FROM 340 DEGREES M TO 327 DEGREES M DURING THE SAME TIME. ALT. WAS REPORTED AS 16,750 FT. NO DISTRESS TRANSMISSIONS WERE RECEIVED.
6. 1400U KLAMATH FALLS WX. 3000 FT. CEILING WITH LGT SNOW SHOWERS, TEMP 40 DEGREES F, DEW PT. 25 DEGREES F, WITH CEILINGS LOWERING. CUMULUS BUILDUPS WERE TO FL 200.
7. UNKNOWN.
8. UNKNOWN.
9. UNKNOWN.
10. BAILOUT UNKNOWN. NO KNOWN SURVIVORS AT THIS TIME.
11. NONE.

PAGE THREE RUWMFTA0095 UNCLAS
12. WRECKAGE FOUND THIS A.M. ON THE 107R/80 MI. OF KLAMATH FALLS VORTAC AT 6500 FT. LEVEL OF MOUNTAINS. SAR OF AREA CONTINUING. NEGATIVE RESULTS. AAR BOARD ENROUTE TO CRASH SCENE. STATUS OF INJURIES OF FATALITIES UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
SUPPLEMENTARY MSG NR 2 TO FOLLOW.
BT

14/67
SUPP
AAR
APR
062340Z
A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67A 4-5-67

MESSAGE DRAFT
SND 4462 (New 2/58)

CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 6 APRIL 1967

FROM: NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

DRAFTER [redacted]

CAPT. [redacted] O&D

R [redacted]

ACTION
VAH-123
COM TWELVE
COM THIRTEEN

PRECEDENCE
X Routine X

INFO
CNO
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIR WHIDBEY
NAS WHIDBEY
COMREADRKCARAIRWING-12
NAVAIRSYSREPAC

TEXT

UNCLAS E F T O

A3B BUNO 138917 ACCIDENT

1. LCDR [redacted] USN, CLRD TOP SECRET WILL INVESTIGATE SUBJECT ACCIDENT. INVESTIGATOR CURRENTLY AT ALAMEDA AND WILL ARRANGE EARLIST TRANSPORTATION.

2. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN OPNAVINST P3750.6E PAGE 19, PARA 30.B, AND PAGE 25, PARA 39A (PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE) APPLY.

A3B 138917 VAH-123 4-5-67

REFERENCE MESSAGE

TRANSMIT BY	CLASS OF REF.	CWO	TO COMM. OFFICE	DATE/TIME GROUP
RADIO —				062233Z

NNNNZCZCNASC0 CZCSLA052
PITE JAW RUWM A0024 0960300-EEEE--RUCILSA.
ZNY EEEEE
P R 030300Z AI 67
FM HATRON ONE WO THREE
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUWJMUA/COMNA IRPAC
RUWJMUA/NAVAI SYSCOMREPAC
RUCILSA/NAVAV AFECEN
INFO RUEDBHB/ VAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWMMEA/COMTW VE
ZEN/COMFAIRWH BEY
RUWJAPA/COMRE AIRCARAIRWING TWELVE
RUHLHL/CINCPA LT
RUWJNDA/NAVPL TREPO DOUGLAS LBEACH
RUEDBNB/CHNAV T
RUWMHMA/COMTH TEEN
BT
UNCLAS E F T O FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRELIMINARY MI SAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 50.6F
1. 5 APR, 143 , DAY
2. A B, 13891 VAH-123, A/R 1-67

PAGE TWO RUWM A0024 UNCLAS E F T O
3. 101 DEG/64 AKEVIEW VORTAC
4. PILOT RICH D EARL PARKE, LCDR, (b) (6) , USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM.
5. DONALD EDW KING, LCDR (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, INSTRUCTOR PILOT.
CARL VIRGIL M LER JR., AD3, (b) (6) USN, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, PWANE CAPTAIN
JAMES MERRITT EADER, LCDR (b) (6) , USN, 1310, ACTIVE, UNIFORM, PAX.
6. UNKNOWN
7. INSTRUMENT RAINING FLIGHT
8. UNKNOWN
9. ACFT ENROU FROM NAS MIRAMAR TO NAS WHIDBEY IS. FL 180.
I PLUS 15 AFTE TAKE OFF CENTER CONTROLLER OBSERVED ON RADAR LEFT DEVIATION FRO COURSE FOLLOWED BY LOST CONTACT. RADIO CONTACT HAD NEVER BEE ESTABLISHED.
10. ESTIMATED EA IN AREA OF LOST CONTACT, COMULUS BUILDUPS TO FL 200 TURBULENCE MODERATE OCCASIONALLY SEVERE. SURFACE WEA 1-2000 OVERCAST, RAI AND SNOW SHOWERS, VIS RESTRICTED IN SHOWERS.
11. UNKNOWN

PAGE THREE RUW FTA0024 UNCLAS E F T O
12. UNKNOWN
13. UNKNOWN
14. UNKNOWN
15. SEARCH EFFORTS HAMPERED BY WEA IN AREA. SEARCH ACFT ON STATION.
16. (b) (6) , CDR, COMMANDING OFFICER, HATRON ONE TWO THREE, 257-2460.
BT

AAR

A3B 138917 VAH-123 1-67 4-5-67